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I. INTRODUCTION
Current societies are far more interconnected than societies have ever
been in the past.1 With the advances of technology and infrastructure,
networks have quickly become an integral part of our daily lives. A
modern city would struggle to function without networks of waste
management; sewers; power grids; water pipelines; transportation;
distribution of goods, food, or services; health care; education;
telecommunications; and banking.2 Most of these networks often span
regionally and globally, generating networks of networks through an
engineered “webbing of humanity.”3 When we update our status on
Facebook, tweet, or share instant messages through mobile networks or
communication apps on our smartphones, we are entangled in this web and
proliferate it. We aim to find jobs, friends, lovers, and spouses through
networks engineered to computationally match the data that we provide.
But networks do not only exist in the external world. Our physiological
construction operates through naturally occurring networks.
Brain
development and function represent a highly complex, integrated network
of signaling and communication among neurons and other nerve cells,
muscles, or gland cells. Proteins interact with other proteins in protein
interaction networks.4
This is the story of networks. It is a fascinating tale that reaches
across centuries and has become an important part of our lives, our
communities, and of the world. As networks continue to occupy an everlarger space in our daily realities, we need to understand them better than
we currently do. But despite or, perhaps, due to the embeddedness of
networks in our physical, virtual, and physiological worlds, we are often
unaware of their existence in legal systems—it is as if they are hidden in
plain sight. Even when we see them, we sometimes become oblivious to
their operation or salience due to our preexisting systemic perceptions and
mental blind spots. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has
suggested that, unlike popular belief, the outside mirrors in a car can be
adjusted to eliminate blind spots.5 When correctly positioned, the mirrors
negate a car’s blind spots. The only problem is getting used to the SAErecommended mirror positions. Similarly, with our mental blind spots,
1
See generally COMMITTEE ON
ET AL., NETWORK SCIENCE 7 (2005).
2

NETWORK SCIENCE

FOR

FUTURE ARMY APPLICATIONS

BRUCE J. WEST & NICOLA SCAFETTA, DISRUPTED NETWORKS: FROM PHYSICS TO
CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2010).
3
Id.
4
Trey Ideker et al., Discovering Regulatory and Signaling Circuits in Molecular
Interaction Networks, 18 BIOINFORMATICS S233 (2002).
5
George Platzer, The Geometry of Automotive Rearview Mirrors - Why Blind Zones
Exist and Strategies to Overcome Them, SAE TECHNICAL PAPER 143 (1995).
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training our “mental eyes” to see the world in networks will hopefully
allow us to ease into seeing the international system in its networks too.
The purpose of this article is twofold. First, it aims to systematize
some of the understandings that other disciplines have to offer in bringing
together a set of “best practices” that will guide future research in
recognizing, mapping, and utilizing networks in legislative action, and
international legislative action in particular. Second, it will provide a
methodological framework of analysis and introduce a set of tools that will
improve our understanding of contemporary international legislative action.
In Part II of this article, I propose that we re-conceptualize the
international legal system through a networks perspective. I address first
the different analytic lens that networks provide by looking at the ways
various actors generally connect; how different patterns of connection yield
different types of networks; and how the position, quantity, and quality of
ties an actor has with other actors in the network determines leadership,
influence, power, and effect within the network, but also of the network
itself. Then, I discuss how networks have emerged as salient structures in
the international system and juxtapose this development to existing statecentric perspectives of this system. The purpose of this part is to show how
we can learn to see the international system in networks. This part of the
Article captures an international reality in which states still retain their
agency as important actors, while also connecting with other states and
non-state actors through a multiplicity of networks. In this world, states,
government officials, agencies, international organizations, NGOs,
corporations, and even individuals, all create networks that influence the
international system, and each participant is capable of operating as a
distinct actor within these networks towards legislative action.
In Part III of the Article, I introduce a methodological framework for
the study of networks as structures, examining their role and impact on the
making of international law. I put forward the main metrics of this
framework based on social network analysis, its quantitative tools but also
its limitations, to examine how agents connect and behave in small or large
groups of actors that introduce, adopt, or dissolve international norms.
This insight provides us with a tool to quantify and map actors’ and
networks’ contributions to international legislative processes as well as
interpret the elusive global realities that lead to international law making.
It allows us to understand the wide spectrum of actors, structures, and
designs involved in international law making and offers a way to quantify
the impact and effect of these actors individually and collectively on the
making of international law. Finally, it can help us to tailor networked
solutions to our international problems so that international legislative
action can be more effective.
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II. HOW NETWORKS MAKE US SEE THE LEGAL SYSTEM DIFFERENTLY
A. Introducing Networks: From Kant to Facebook
This story of networks begins in Königsberg, a small Russian semiexclave between Poland and Lithuania on the southeastern corner of the
Baltic Sea now called Kaliningrad. The 18th century philosopher Immanuel
Kant lived there, when it was still part of the Kingdom of Prussia, and he
was known there as Immanuel “the Königsberg clock.”6 Kant was
renowned for his strict daily routines and his regular walks around the city.
While we do not know his exact routine, most likely, on these walks, he
would encounter one of Königsberg’s seven famous bridges.
The bridges had spurred an urban riddle known as the “Königsberg
bridge problem”: is it possible to walk around the city across all seven
bridges without crossing the same bridge twice?7 Leonhard Euler, one of
the greatest mathematicians of the time, began to solve this enigma.
Perhaps without knowing it, Euler developed a new type of mathematics
called graph theory. By turning the city into a graph, Euler labeled each of
the four land masses surrounding the bridges as nodes, and the bridges as
links among those nodes.8 By analyzing the structure of the graph, Euler
proved that the only way someone could walk across the bridges only once
would be if there were an even number of bridges and that, in Königsberg’s
seven bridges, such thing would be impossible.9 This study introduced the
method of graph theory as a way of analyzing networks. And, while we
never learned of Kant’s true walking routine, we are now sure of one thing:
Kant never crossed all seven bridges without crossing at least one of them
twice.
While the seven bridges of Königsberg were the springboard for the
emergence of graph theory in spatial networks, the first analysis of a social
network took place in New York. In 1932, the New York State Training
School for Girls in Hudson approached J. L. Moreno to address an outbreak
of fourteen girls running away in two weeks’ time.10 Instead of addressing
each case individually, Moreno mapped all fourteen girls on a graph to
6
John Merrick, Immanuel Kant the, Errrr, Walker?, VERSO (Apr. 30, 2015), www.ver
sobooks.com/blogs/1963-immanuel-kant-the-errrr-walker.
7
Rob Shields, Cultural Topology: The Seven Bridges of Königsburg, 1736, 29
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 43, 44 (2012).
8
Leonhard Euler, Solutio problematis ad geometriam situs pertinentes, 8
COMMENTARII ACADEMIAE SCIENTIARUM PETROPOLITANAE 128 (1741). See also Gary
Chartrand, The Königsberg Bridge Problem: An Introduction to Eulerian Graphs,
in INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY 51–66 (1985).
9
Euler, supra note 8, at 128.
10
See Diana Jones, Emotions Mapped by New Geography: Charts Seek to Portray the
Psychological Currents of Human Relationships, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1933, at 17.
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assess how each influenced the other in bringing about a social “epidemic.”
Moreno used network diagrams called “sociograms” to assign students to
various residential cottages.11 He found that assignments that considered
the results of his sociometric findings substantially reduced the number of
runaways from the school.12
At P.S. 181 in Brooklyn, Moreno applied his sociograms to observe
the relationships between boys and girls in grades kindergarten through
eighth grade.13 Moreno and his research team recorded the children’s
choices of who to sit next to while studying or playing. They then
constructed sociograms with triangles representing boys and circles
representing girls and the students’ initials in the middle. Moreno’s
sociograms from a fourth-grade class indicates that not much has changed
in over 80 years within children’s society. The girls are clustered on the
one side, the boys on the other, with only one “brave” boy reaching out to
one girl to sit next to. The sociogram also indicates an isolated pair of girls
that only reached out to each other. A teacher in this class back then or
even today could use this sociogram to keep an eye out for classroom
interactions, including bullying, while more elaborate analysis could shed
light on nuanced classroom dynamics.
Moreno’s sociograms opened the door to further systematization of
networks and analysis of their role in our daily lives. But before Moreno,
the Hungarian writer Frigyes Karinthy devised a notion of peoples’
proximity in a short fiction story called “Chain Links” in 1929.14 To
demonstrate that people were closer at that time than ever before,
Karinthy’s fictional protagonist proposed a test. He bet that his friends
could name any person within Earth’s entire population and through at
most five friends or acquaintances, one of which he knew personally, he
could link himself to this randomly selected person.15 This idea, also called
“the small-world problem,” fascinated social scientists and laymen alike.
In the 1950s, two scientists, Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfred Kochen, set
out to test the theory—known as the “small world problem—
mathematically.16 But despite their success in framing the question
11

Id.
JACOB L. MORENO, WHO SHALL SURVIVE? FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIOMETRY, GROUP
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SOCIODRAMA 527 (1934).
13
Id. at 13.
14
Frigyes Karinthy, Chain Links, in THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 21,
22 (Mark Newman et al. eds., 2006).
15
Id.
16
Charles Korte & Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Networks Between Racial Groups:
Application of the Small World Method, 15 J. PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. 101, 101 (1970)
(referencing Ithiel de Sola Pool and Manfed Kochen); Ithiel de Sola Pool & Manfred
Kochen, Contacts and Influence, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 5, 7 (1978).
12
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mathematically, they were still unable to solve the problem twenty years
later.17
Social psychologist Stanley Milgram undertook a 1967 study that
served as the first empirical approach to the small-world problem.
Milgram’s goal was to test the degrees of separation between any two
random individuals in the United States by answering the question of how
many acquaintances it took to connect them.18 He first chose the wife of a
divinity graduate student in Sharon, Massachusetts and a stockbroker in
Boston, Massachusetts as the two targets of his study. He then chose
Wichita, Kansas and Omaha, Nebraska, as the two starting points of the
study because “from Cambridge, these cities seem vaguely ‘out there,’ on
the Great Plains or somewhere.”19 At the time, there was nearly no
consensus as to how many links it would take to connect people from such
remote areas. Milgram wrote, “[r]ecently, when I asked a person of
intelligence how many steps he thought it would take, and he estimated that
it would require 100 intermediate persons, or more, to move from Nebraska
to Sharon.”20
Milgram sent letters to these individuals detailing the study and some
basic information about either of the two target contact persons in Boston.21
He also included a roster on which they would write their own names.
Upon receiving these, the volunteers were asked if they personally knew
the contact person designated by Milgram in Boston. In the unlikely case
that they knew this person, they had to forward the letter directly to them.
In the more likely case that they did not know this person, they were asked
to think of a friend or a relative whom they knew and was more likely to
know the target. They were then asked to sign this person’s name on the
roster and forward it to them. When the package eventually reached the
final target in Boston, the researchers examined the roster to count the
number of times the package had been forwarded.22 Milgram’s study—
published in 1967—found that the messages were delivered by “chains”
comprising anywhere between two and ten intermediaries, with the average
number being five intermediaries.23
Milgram’s experiment sprung out of a desire to better understand how
people were connected. Most importantly, Milligram’s study proved that

17

Korte & Stanley Milgram, supra note 16.
Jeffrey Travers & Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY
61, 62 (1967).
19
Id. at 64.
20
Id. at 65.
21
Id. at 60–67.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 65.
18
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the world is a much smaller social network of interlinked individuals than
we ever imagined and provided the ultimate benchmark against which our
interconnectedness these days can be measured.
Indeed, Facebook decided to run its own experiment based on
Milligram’s idea to find whether the median number of five intermediaries
that Milgram had found still stood today. While Karinthy had speculated,
and Milgram proved, that a chain of just five individuals between people
can link any two on the planet, Facebook’s studies across years suggest that
the world is growing smaller and smaller while we become more and more
interconnected.24 In 2011, when Facebook had just over one tenth of the
world’s population as active users, they found that there were 3.74 degrees
of separation.25 In 2016, with Facebook’s active users increasing to 1.5
billion—roughly one quarter of the world’s population—the research
suggested that there are 3.57 degrees of separation. In other words, if you
pick any two Facebook users, each is connected to every other person by an
average of three and a half other people.26
Today, social media platforms have taken it upon themselves to
capitalize on pre-existing human networks but also boost peoples’
interconnectedness. With technological advances making the relevance of
networks in our daily lives and the world ever more evident, the
significance of networks cannot be overstated.
B. The Different Lens of Networks
The term “network” is used almost open-endedly to refer to several
structural formations across disciplines. In the widely-cited definition of
Joel M. Podolny and Karen L. Page, a network is “any collection of actors
(n≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange of relations with one another
and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate
and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange.”27 In scholarship,
networks are usually juxtaposed with markets and hierarchies, as
alternative structures.28 Fields as diverse as social sciences, biology,
engineering, computer science, and organizational studies, have identified
and recognized the importance of networks and their role in the
development of a “systems theory” in each respective discipline.29
24
Smriti Bhagat et al., Three and a Half Degrees of Separation, FACEBOOK RES. (Feb.
4, 2016), https://research.fb.com/blog/2016/02/three-and-a-half-degrees-of-separation/.
25
Facebook Users Average 3.74 Degrees of Separation, BBC NEWS (Nov. 23, 2011),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-15844230.
26
Bhagat, supra note 24.
27
Joel M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV.
SOC. 57, 59 (1998).
28
MILES KAHLER, NETWORKED POLITICS: AGENCY, POWER, AND GOVERNANCE 2 (2015).
29
See, e.g., Michael G.H. Bell, A Game Theory Approach to Measuring the
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In terms of structure, the core building blocks of a network are its
nodes and edges.30 A node is usually an actor and edges represent the
relationships among multiple nodes. In other words, a network is a set of
interconnected nodes. What constitutes a node and an edge depends on the
context and application of a network. These can be people and the
relationships among them. They can be countries and their global trade
relationships. They can be poppy fields and clandestine drug trafficking
groups. They can be stock exchange markets and service centers in global
financial flows. They can be Hollywood actors and the movies they star in.
The term “network” has been applied liberally due to the unique
nature of each network. But networks traditionally share a set of minimum
common characteristics such as participation, process, enforcement, and
institutionalization.31 The main construction of the term “network” across
fields reflects a group of nonhierarchical but heavily interdependent
entities.32 These entities often exhibit high levels of informality in
collaboration while demonstrating increased rule making functions.33 This
very nature of networks often offers a fast and flexible alternative to
traditional organization and rulemaking that can provide more expedient
and effective responses. This is one of the most important characteristics
for the role of networks in international law making that will be the focus
of our analysis of networks in the international system.
But before jumping to the legal and international system there is a
more elementary set of questions that linger: why do networks emerge and
what warrants their analysis? Networks, as structures, fall in the middle
between hierarchies and markets. On the one hand, hierarchies represent

Performance Reliability of Transport Networks, 34 TRANSP. RES. PART B:
METHODOLOGICAL 533, 533 (2000); Jennifer A. Dunne et al., Food-Web Structure and
Network Theory: The Role of Connectance and Size, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12917,
12917 (2002); Alireza Khotanzad et al., ANNSTLF-Artificial Neural Network Short-Term
Electric Load Forecasting System Generation Three, 13 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER
SYS. 1413, 1413 (1997); Michael J. Lovaglia et al., Negotiated Exchanges in Social
Networks, 74 SOC. FORCES 123, 123 (1995); Ron Milo et al., Network Motifs: Simple
Building Blocks of Complex Networks, 298 SCI. 824, 824−25 (2002); R. Bruce Money,
International Multilateral Negotiations and Social Networks, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 695,
695 (1998).
30
David Lazer, Networks and Politics: The Case of Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 246 (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012).
31
Abraham Newman & David T. Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy,
and Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 244, 245 (Jeffrey Dunoff & Mark
Pollack eds., 2013).
32
Lazer, supra note 30, at 245.
33
Id.; Yane Svetiev, The Limits of Informal International Law, in INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 271, 271 (Joost Pauwelyn et al. eds., 2012).
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an organizational model that is based on rule-driven design and direction.34
Markets, on the other hand, are largely decentralized and achieve
coordination by using intuitive methods such as signaling.35 Networks are
neither as rigid as hierarchies nor as fluid as markets. Instead, they contain
more informal linkages than the heavily bureaucratic hierarchies but have a
more sophisticated organizational coordination beyond the mere signaling
mechanisms of markets. They tend to emerge where markets and
hierarchies are not present or are unable to provide a necessary or optimal
organizational platform for action.36
There is not one clear explanation as to why networks emerge.
Optimistic functionalism often answers the question “why do networks
emerge?” by justifying the end result of delivering a beneficial outcome.37
Yet organizational structures may also emerge and persist through time due
to convenience, habit, or inertia, without necessarily carrying a functional
advantage over others.38 While hierarchies tend to be too rigid and value
rank over flexibility and agility, markets are too opportunistic and shorttermed to provide actors with sufficient and well-informed results.39 A
hybrid organizational form like the network falls into neither of these traps:
it carries some of the flexibility of markets and combines it with the more
principled and less opportunistic reciprocal approach of hierarchies.
Networks are also capable of having their own distributions of power,
hierarchy, and governance.40 They do not always function as flat
environments of link distribution, but rather as “scale-free” entities with
actors that may assume more or less dominant positions based on their
centrality within the network.41 Networks are thus usually quicker to react
than hierarchies and more effective to respond to complexity than
markets.42 These three organizational models may also exist in symbiosis,
such as networks we encounter within hierarchical environments or
34

GRAHAME THOMPSON, BETWEEN HIERARCHIES AND MARKETS: THE LOGIC AND LIMITS
OF NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION 22 (2003)
35

Id. at 24.
ROBERT J. HOLTON, GLOBAL NETWORKS 32 (2007).
37
See Timur Kuran, The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective
Conservatism, 10 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 143, 144 (1988).
38
HOLTON, supra note 36, at 33.
39
HOLTON, supra note 36, at 35.
40
CHARLI R. CARPENTER, “LOST” CAUSES: AGENDA VETTING IN GLOBAL ISSUE
NETWORKS AND THE SHAPING OF HUMAN SECURITY 20 (2014).
41
The term “scale-free” refers to the following property. Consider degree d and some
other degree cd, for some scalar c and a parameter y. Their relative frequencies are
𝑑 −𝑦 ⁄(𝑐𝑑−𝑦 )𝑜𝑟 𝑐 𝑦 . Now consider some other degree 𝑑′ and another degree 𝑐𝑑′ . Their
relative frequencies are also 𝑐 𝑦 . Thus, regardless of how we have rescaled things, relative
frequencies depend only on relative sizes and not on the absolute scale.
42
HOLTON, supra note 36, at 35.
36
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markets.43 But, at all times, configuring the relationships among the nodes
of networks helps to map how these structures function and to measure
their various effects.44
There are many systems of interest to researchers that are structured
as networks, from the Internet and World Wide Web, to social interactions,
human societies, chemical particles, products distribution, military
alliances, and interactions among judges and courts. Certain mathematical
and statistical tools can reduce these systems from abstract structures to
sets of simplified representations of connections and patterns. This method
has its limitations but offers important advantages, especially when
combined with additional or mixed research methods. Getting accustomed
to seeing the world through networks requires a conceptual and
epistemological shift that some disciplines have embraced more than
others. Surveying the way the introduction of a networks perspective has
affected the closest discipline to international law, that of international
relations, will help us better implement this shift in the way we perceive the
international legal system, and thereby come to understand it better.
C. Networks in the International Legal System
To explore the ways in which actors connect, it is critical to establish
an analytical framework. One of the primary purposes of international law
has been to facilitate solutions in different sets of problems caused by the
anarchical international system and its central governance vacuum. 45 The
range of international problems that could trigger international normative
development is nearly infinite. But under such problem-driven approach,
one can identify certain types of networks that preexist or emerge to
address a certain type of problem through normative development such as
treaty, customary international law, or even soft law.
These networks represent any empirically verifiable and demonstrable
group of actors and their interactions throughout certain law making
processes that lead to international normative development.46 These can
include but are not limited to states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, international or domestic courts and tribunals,
and even corporations or individuals. There is no established line of
demarcation separating the actors that may be involved in the networks and
those that may not for the purposes of research analysis. The deciding
factor for these actors is simply their connection to other actors involved in
43

HOLTON, supra note 36, at 37.
Lazer, supra note 30, at 245.
45
See Irena Omelaniuk, Global Migration Institutions and Processes, in FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 336 (Brian Opeskin et al. eds., 2012).
46
See supra notes 20–27.
44
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international legislative processes. The goal then is to map, through
quantitative means, which actors contribute what to the legislative network,
or to the process of normative development, and why.
Networks were introduced in politics and international relations in the
1970s in an effort to unpack traditional concepts of what constitutes the
“state.”47 International political economy began to focus its analytical lens
on sub-state interactions and their policy outcomes as a result of the forces
of growing economic and political interdependence.48 Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye introduced and defined the concept of “transgovernmental
relations” as relations between officials “that are not controlled or closely
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those
governments.”49 The 1980s decline of the US hegemony and rise of new
powers engendered further theories that focused on the interactions of
different sets of actors beyond unitary states within the international
system.50 In the 1990s, Peter Haas promulgated the idea of an “epistemic
community” operating as “a network of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim
to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”51 AnneMarie Slaughter advanced the idea of a “new world order” that is
increasingly shaped by networks of lower-level governmental officials with
cross-border policy agendas.52 These officials’ formal or informal
interactions with their foreign counterparts and without direct central
authority involvement gives them a special role in cross-border
regulation.53
These developments have led to a conceptual and epistemological
shift from states as sole unitary actors acting within an international system
that appeared to have space only for them, to their “disaggregation” into
their many individual components.54 Some early scholars in international
47
Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 248; see also ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S.
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 8 (1977); THOMAS RISSE-KAPPEN, BRINGING
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS BACK IN: NON-STATE ACTORS, DOMESTIC STRUCTURES AND
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 15 (1995).
48
Kal Rausiala, The Rise of Transnational Networks Conference November 7, 2008
Transnational Networks: Past and Present, 43 INT’L L. 205, 206 (2009).
49
KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 47, at 42.
50
Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International: An Update,
2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 211, 214 (2006).
51
Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992).
52
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40
STAN. J. INT’L L. 40, 283 (2004).
53
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 62 (2009).
54
See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 47, at 8; RISSE-KAPPEN, supra note 47, at 15;
Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 248; Slaughter, supra note 52, at 283.
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law had also emphasized the importance of tracing the rise, position, and
relationships of those components, some of which, in lieu of a better term,55
became known as “non-state actors.”56 Legal process theorists first
introduced the idea of a web of state and non-state actors in the 1950s and
1960s without developing a comprehensive theory on their role and effect
in international law.57 This was likely due to strict conceptions of “legal
personality” that barred such informal structures from having a seat at the
table of the exclusive club of state actors participating in international law
and international relations.58 At the same time, cross-border disputes
presented issues for which traditional international law tools were not
equipped to handle and caused some areas of international law to witness
increased network proliferation.59 Fields such as environmental law and
international financial regulation were increasingly exposed to challenges
that required a new type of international coordination addressing the
practical necessities of international interdependence.60 These ventures,
however, lacked a more comprehensive conceptual framework of analysis,
or were simply viewed as practical instead of binding legislative
coordinative efforts in response to systemic deficiencies.61 The networks
scholarship that emerged in these fields mostly assumed the more limited
task of documenting the evolution of regulatory networks and their effect
on actors’ structures and power distributions.62
In sum, the field of international relations has been preoccupied with
questions relating to the nature of these networks of state and non-state
actors,63 their operations,64 and their effect on power distributions,65 policy
As Philip Alston suggested, international law suffers from the “not-a-cat-syndrome”
in its reference to “non-state actors” as “non-state.” See Philip Alston, The ‘Not-a-Cat’
Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?,
in NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3 (Philip Alston ed., 2005). This
marginalizes the scope of research and reinforces “the assumption that the state is the only
central actor.” Id.
56
See generally PHILIP CARYL JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) (discussing Philip
Jessup as having introduced international lawyers to “transnational law” in 1958 and
defining it as “all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.
Both public and private International Law are included, as are other rules which do not
wholly fit into such standard categories.”); see also HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1976) (describing how Henry Steiner and Detlev Vagts
later translated this concept into a case-book, collecting materials designed to bridge the gap
between the domestic and international legal world in HENRY J. STEINER ET AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS: MATERIALS AND TEXT (1986)).
57
Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 213.
58
Id.
59
Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 215.
60
Id.; Raustiala, supra note 48, at 206.
61
Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 214.
62
Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 50, at 211–12.
63
Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
55
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convergence,66 and agenda setting.67 International legal scholarship has
largely shied away from the complications that non-state actors and the
networks they tap into present to traditionally rigid areas such as that of
international law making.68 The study of non-state actors and the networks
they belong to in international law has been limited to identifying the
relationships among non-state actors and states under the assumption that
the former lack any constitutive legislative power. This establishes a gap
between the policy nature and effect of non-state actors and networks, on
the one hand, and their potential legislative effect, on the other.
But an extraordinary range of international law norms is created today
by actors and through processes that do not fit easily into the traditional
state actors of international law.69 Although states remain the primary
makers of international law, many other participants including international
organizations, courts, as well as influential entities in international law
advocacy, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and even
individuals, are also crucial to the development of international legal
norms.70 One of the problems in contemporary international law is the
disconnect between the way international law is actually made with the
participation of these various actors, on the one hand, and the extensive
theoretical focus on states and their effect on the four classic international
law “sources,” on the other. While scholars are not blind to this gap, there
is, of yet, no formal model integrating these actors into existing
frameworks “that are theoretically and legally structured only for states.”71
The next part of this Article aims to narrow this gap by providing a
framework of analysis for the contributions of these actors and structures to
the making of international law.
Configuring the relationships among the actors, or, as we will be
calling them, nodes of these networks will help us understand how these
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2002); see also
Newman & Zaring, supra note 31, at 253.
64
Slaughter, supra note 52, at 290.
65
Id.
66
Raustiala, supra note 48, at 209.
67
CARPENTER, supra note 40, at 20.
68
For a notable exception to this proposition see Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C.
Shaffer, The Interaction of Formal and Informal International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 251 (Joost Pauwelyn ed., 2012).
69
See generally Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters—Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 137
(2005).
70
See generally ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2007).
71
ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB: STRATEGIES OF
CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 22–23 (2017).
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networks are involved in international law making, and measure their
actual legislative effect.72 Many of the networks that have been involved in
international norm creation are not networks comprised only of states or
networks comprised only of non-state actors. Instead, they are structures
with their own types of relationships and hierarchies in which different
types of actors participate, including states and non-state actors. The
evaluation of the actor distributions and relationships within these networks
will elucidate the ways that normative prescriptions are adopted, diffused,
and cascade, as well as clarify how these emerging norms find their way to
the table, proliferate, and become part of international law.73 Seeing
international relations and international law through networks will provide
international lawyers and international policy-makers with a descriptive
tool that translates and maps the elusive process of international law
making.
But why would international actors engage in such a paradigm shift
that arguably reduces the role of states in international relations and law?
Considering states have traditionally held certain monopolies of power,
such as the monopoly of making international law, it seems almost
counterintuitive that they would choose to engage in relationships with
non-state actors through networks instead of following traditional paths of
rule-making. Non-state actors are becoming increasingly influential, due,
in large part, to the inadequacy of the strict hierarchical state-centered
international system to effectively address emerging international law
problems, such as human rights violations, environmental issues, and
international financial crises.74 Yet states remain the main actor that can
officially legislate in the international terrain, and exercise legitimate
influence and coercion over private actors or organizations.75 This
conundrum has led many non-state actors that were at first critical of the
state system to engage more constructively with it. This process has
yielded the formation of these networks of state and non-state actors.76
Non-state actors also realize that they do not have enough authority to
develop legally-binding norms. They must promote these norms through
transnational campaigns that inform and persuade other actors of their
72

See Lazer, supra note 30, at 245.
For advocacy agenda setting under a similar light see generally CARPENTER, supra
note 40.
74
See generally Angela M. Banks, The Growing Impact of Non-State Actors on the
International and European Legal Systems, 5 INTERNATIONAL LAW FORUM DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 293 (2003).
75
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 77–121 (2002).
76
Kal Raustiala, States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions, 41 INT’L
STUD. Q. 719, 736 (1997).
73
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cause.77 These transnational actors are a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the diffusion and adoption of emerging norms. Non-state
actors eventually need to gain the support of states, tap into their processes,
and inform and influence their beliefs and practice. Sikkink argues that
non-state actors do so through their only available tool, the power of
persuasion.78 She bases this argument on what she believes is the inability
of these groups to “coerce” agreement with a norm. Instead, they can only
rely on discourse, information, and often-dramatized symbolic activity.79
This rings true in a hierarchical international system, where the state is on
the top of the pyramid. But in a world of networks that involve states as
well as non-state actors, the linkages connecting them, and their individual
positions, are of the essence. In this more fluid environment, state and nonstate actors enjoy different structural positions, levels of power and
influence, and carry diverse sets of tools than in the hierarchical system.
As a node in the network, non-state actors, for instance, may position
themselves in ways that confer certain aspects of structural power and
influence without having this power as a matter of law. In analyzing these
relationships with the toolset of network theory, we will find that this new
structural environment offers a means to overcome the inflexibility of
hierarchies, particularly in new international law challenges, without
running the risk of the potential haphazard effect of markets.
Slaughter argues that the continued interaction of sub-state actors
within transgovernmental networks will advance international cooperation
and reduce international conflict.80 She also posits that a combination of
perspectives that includes seeing states as unitary actors and as sites of
different networks offers a way to see the world “in stereo” without either
perspective excluding the other.81 This, for Slaughter, will facilitate the
77

See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1—3 (1998) (discussing the non-state
actors’ role in the anti-slavery campaign, the campaign for women’s suffrage, campaigns for
international human rights and the elimination of violence against women); Audie Klotz,
Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. Sanctions Against South
Africa, 49 INT’L ORG. 451, 451 (1995) (discussing the development of international racial
norms in favor of an international anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa); Richard
Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines, 52 INT’L
ORG. 613, 613 (1998) (discussing non-state actors’ role in recent campaigns against the use
of landmines); Thomas Risse-Kappen, Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational
Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War, 48 INT’L ORG. 185, 187
(1994) (discussing the role of transnational networks of “epistemic communities” in
influencing policy).
78
Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human
Rights, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 517, 519 (1998).
79
Id.
80
SLAUGHTER, supra note 53, at 169–70.
81
SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 66–69.
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development of a set of tools to address the hardest foreign policy problems
by making use of resilience, task and scale based networks.82 Raustiala
considers certain international networks as a tool states can use to more
effectively meet international challenges.83 Zaring maintains that networks
of regulators can more efficiently respond to globalization challenges and
contribute to the rule of law by increasingly incorporating law-like
features.84 Dunoff sees the growth of international networks as an
opportunity for wider participation of non-state actors and particularly the
civil society in international law making.85 Even though these arguments
are intuitively compelling, they lack the descriptive analysis that serves as a
blueprint of exactly how these networks operate and what they produce. A
quantitative method of analysis can assess not only whether these
propositions are accurate, but also decode the intricacies of these new
social and organizational structures, and facilitate even more sophisticated
qualitative findings.
For this reason, it is salient to identify the relevant actors who
participate in international legal processes, their various degrees of
participation, and their capabilities.86 This necessitates a descriptive
approach that has been largely absent from the scholarship or has been
unsystematic. The question of who participates in these networks and on
what grounds is of particular importance to understanding these processes
and evaluating how they fit within the existing frameworks of international
law development.87 Descriptive quantitative work can clarify network
dynamics such as levels of socialization within a network or networks,
diffusion of norms based on the nature and strength of actors or ties, the
importance of certain individual actors, and the formation of actor
identities.88
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SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 77.
Raustiala, supra note 63, at 17–19.
84
David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L. J. 281, 323–25 (1998).
85
See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation,
Frustration, Agitation and Legitimation, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 961, 964 (2004).
86
Andrea Bianchi, The Fight for Inclusion: Non-State Actors and International Law, in
FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUDGE BRUNA SIMMA
39, 48 (Ulrich Fasenrath et al. eds., 2011).
87
Id. at 48–49.
88
Emily M. Hafner-Burton, Miles Kaahler, & Alexander H. Montgomery, Network
Analysis for International Relations, 63 INT’L ORG. 559, 569 (2009).
83
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D. Potential Objections Against Networks
Examining networks of actors on the basis of their involvement in
international legislative processes carries an obvious endemic objection, an
elephant in the room. This elephant, though capable of manifesting in
various forms, goes by the name “legal personality.” While actors such as
non-governmental organizations, international or domestic courts and
tribunals, and even individuals may participate in and interact throughout
certain international law making processes,89 they do not, as a matter of
law, have the necessary legal personality to create international law.90 And
without legal personality, one may be tempted to call this a futile exercise.
If these non-state actors aren’t capable of making international law because
they lack formal recognition as international law makers, why should they
even form part of the analysis? In a legal system where legislative process
and action were fully understood, articulated, and definite, this objection
would be credible. The current international law terrain, however, far from
offers unambiguous answers concerning its normative development.
What happens if, for the sake of the argument, the proposed analysis
indicates that non-state actors have equal, if not more, power in putting
forward new or amended international law norms than states? Notice the
circularity problem: if we are to continue to operate under the presumption
that actors that are currently lacking legal personality but are actively
participating in international legislative processes don’t matter for
international law making, then we may never trace and understand their de
facto role in them. Yet such increased appreciation may assist in clearing
out the existing clouds surrounding the development of international law
and perhaps even clarify the source of our haze. The goal of this Article is
not to make any normative claim over the nature and legal position of nonstate actors. Instead, it carves out a far more limited and perhaps less
ambitious task. That is to offer a framework with which to map which
actors contribute what to the process of international normative
development and how. For these purposes, certain objections become less
salient or “objectionable.”

89

CRAWFORD, supra note 75, at 30; Hollis, supra note 69, at 137.
See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
1949 I.C.J. 174, 178 (Apr. 11). A development that expanded notions of legal personality in
current mainstream approaches to international law is the case of International
Organizations that enjoy legal personality in relation to the states that created or interact
with them. Id. Despite this relative exception of International Organizations to the general
legal personality the debate still stands often in relation to other non-state actors but also
International Organizations.
90
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1. The “Subjects” Doctrine
International legal doctrine is preoccupied with identifying the ways
of determining who has the legal personality and, therefore, authority to
create international law – rendered as “subjects” of international law – but
also, the legitimacy to participate in international legislative processes with
normative effect.91 Meanwhile, developments in international relations do
not always render the social structure of international law and its “subjects”
as mutually constitutive.”92 The emergence of different actors in the
international community with a “variety of participants, making claims
across state lines” has blurred the strict line of demarcation between
“subjects” and “non-subjects” of international law.93 It is true that when
“one tries to define the precise extent of the legal personality which nonstate actors have acquired, one enters into a very controversial area of the
law. The problem of including new actors in the legal system is reflected in
the very concept of legal personality.”94 Challenges to traditional
conceptions of legal personality in international law not only question the
role of the state, but also the subject versus non-subject binary. It is
precisely the growing number of non-state actors that take part in
international law making processes, originally reserved for states, that lead
us to ask whether the notion of legal personality has changed, or whether
we witness different levels and forms of legal personality that diverge from
the “original” one that attached only to states regarding international law
making.95
Most objections and skepticism on the inclining role of non-state
actors in international law arise from this emphasis on legal personality.
Few attempts have been made to establish a new working framework
separate from the traditional “subjects doctrine” that could incorporate the
increased influence and participation of non-state actors in international
law making. Some argue that de facto influential actors in international
law making – be it state or non-state actors – have a normative
responsibility,96 and a presumed duty to conform to international
obligations attached to “the promotion of community interests such as the
91

Bianchi, supra note 86, at 42.
Bianchi, supra note 86, at 41.
93
ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE
IT 150 (1994).
94
ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (Alexander Orakhelashvili ed., 8th ed. 2018).
95
See Math Noortmann, Transnational Law: Philip Jessup’s Legacy and Beyond, in
NON-STATE ACTOR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57, 63 (Noortmann et al. eds., 2001).
96
Karsten Nowrot, New Approaches to the International Legal Personality of
Multinational Corporations: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative
Responsibilities, 9 J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1993).
92
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protection of human rights, the environment, and core labor and social
standards.”97 Others propose a reevaluation of the structure of international
law and departure from the formalistic doctrines of subjects and legal
personality altogether: “The new actors in our globalizing world might
more easily be molded into the system of international law if we try to
conceive of them as factors and forces of a broader constitutional order.”98
In this constitutionalist perspective, states no longer have a law making
monopoly but instead are participants in a larger spectrum of actors
involved. A third approach attempts to revise the notion of international
legal personality based on cosmopolitan and hermeneutic theories.99 It
argues that individuals possess “a natural right to political participation
[and] the right to have rights, [which] includes the right to live in a world
governed by just institutions[.]”100 It posits that the notions of “subjects”
and “legal personality” in international law are changing and non-state
actors have a “natural right to political participation”101 or “at least a
legitimate expectation” to a “general right to participate in international
legal discourse.”102
Notwithstanding the growing recognition of non-state actors, legal
doctrine still considers international law making as an essential prerogative
of states, and states as the sole “subjects” of international law for its
purposes.103 The gap between legal formalism and the normative activism
of non-state actors including their growing international privileges and
expectations remains and increases.104 According to Charlesworth and
Chinkin, the reason is that these actors “are often considered part of the

97

Bianchi, supra note 86, at 43.
Daniel Thürer, The Emergence of Non-Governmental Organizations and
Transnational Enterprises in International Law and the Changing Role of the State, in NONSTATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 74 (Rainer Hofmann & Nils
Geissler eds., 1999).
99
JANNE ELISABETH NIJMAN, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 472–73 (2004).
100
Id. at 472.
101
Id. at 473; see also Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in
Global Governance, 10 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 45 (2003).
102
ANNA-KARIN LINDBLOM, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 526 (2005).
103
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE: NON-STATE
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AIMS, APPROACH AND SCOPE OF PROJECT AND LEGAL
ISSUES 655 (2010); see, for an anthology of international legal personality, Fleur E. Johns,
International Legal Personality (Sydney Law Sch., Res. Paper No. 09/113, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1487383.
103
Noortmann, supra note 95, at 71.
103
HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 31 (2000).
104
Noortmann, supra note 95, at 71.
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‘private’ within the international legal arenas and part of the ‘public’ in the
domestic fora.”105 But they equally acknowledge that the “location [of
non-state actors] at the intersection between public and private spheres
illustrates the changing boundaries of International Law.”106 This tension
between the existing largely formalistic legal framework and the growing
factual reality has been further complicated by questions of legitimacy,
accountability, and a lack of democratic deficit of non-state actors.107
While these objections are not necessarily without merit, they creep in due
to lack of a more systematic representation and understanding of
international law making that incorporates these actors and traces their
effect. I propose instead that seeing international law making processes
through the networks that facilitate them will allow us to map the actors
involved, trace their effect, understand their synergies, and facilitate a
framework that is a measured reflection of international law making today.
2. Questions of Legitimacy
In addition to the changing role of state and non-state actors in
international law, there are also theoretical and methodological concerns
regarding any inclusion of non-state actors in international law making.
These concerns involve: (1) whether the state is the only legitimate
international law actor; (2) if not, whether non-state actors possess the
sufficient elements to be considered legitimate; and (3) whether they can be
held accountable for their practice.108 Even though the debates on the
nature and meaning of the term “legitimacy” are a long and arduous matter,
we generally understand legitimacy as either a social concept or a
normative concept. As a social matter, to be legitimate means to be
accepted and recognized. As a normative matter, it means to be worthy of
being recognized.109 The two concepts are analytically and conceptually
independent. For instance, the adoption of a standard such as the exclusion
of women from voting may be socially legitimate if all members of a
society recognize it as such. It would be normatively legitimate only if it
conforms with currently accepted civil and human rights standards.
There are two main ways of assessing normative legitimacy.
According to the more utilitarian “outcome legitimacy,” the more effective
an actor or a circumstance is at delivering outcomes that are satisfactory to

105

CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 103.
Id.
107
Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 68, at 243.
108
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 103, at 645.
109
Anne Peters et al., Towards Non-State Actors as Effective, Legitimate and
Accountable Standard Setters, in NON-STATE ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS 492, 511
(Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
106
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the greater amount of people, the more legitimate they are.110 On the other
hand, “process legitimacy” attaches itself to the means through which these
outcomes are achieved irrespective of their end quality; in other words
whether the processes are fair, transparent, and accountable.111 Typically,
non-state actors receive attacks on both these legitimacy counts. Non-state
actors exercising governance functions often trigger questions of
transparency or accessibility when juxtaposed to elected government.112
The relative flexibility and informality of their operations suggests, for
some, that they do not fall under the same constraints imposed on more
“formal” types of governance, including standards and procedures.113
Is there merit to these attacks? I think the answer is yes, in part. But
we may resolve these legitimacy issues without abandoning attention on
the undoubted involvement of non-state actors in international law and
international law making. Many legitimacy objections over non-state actor
participation are based on traditional, vertical, state-centric views of the
international system. States are able to control the extent and quality of
non-state actor participation in their constituencies, expand or restrict it at
will, while exercising and maintaining their full traditional sovereignty. 114
The limited role carved out for non-state actors may well stem from
transposing a legitimacy model that belongs to hierarchical legal and
political structures into a more mixed and increasingly horizontal
international landscape. Such an approach effectively attempts to draw an
analogy between systems that, at least for purposes of legitimacy, are
fundamentally distinct.
But even if we were to accept, for the sake of the argument, that,
currently, non-state actors are treated under the correct legitimacy standard,
the question remains: do we hold non-state actors to the same legitimacy
requirements to which we hold the rest of the international system?
Andrew Moravcisk has argued that it is important not to impose more rigid
legitimacy requirements on non-state actors than we do on states.115 While
non-state actors are often attacked for legitimacy gaps because they are
compared to idealized democratic systems and formalistic notions of

110

Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Power and Legitimacy of Government Networks, in
SOCIETY FOR INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE, THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE, NEW FORMS OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (2004).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International
Environmental Law, 3 NON-STATE ACTORS INT’L L. 23, 70, 88–89 (2003).
115
Andrew Moravcisk, Is There a “Democratic Deficit” in World Politics? A
Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336, 337 (2004).
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legitimacy, we do not often hold states to such standards in practice.116
Where states do not live up to their expected legitimacy standards, holding
non-state actors against idealized forms of state governance instead of “real
world” standards may seem, in itself, rather “illegitimate.”
To examine non-state actors’ outcome legitimacy, it is helpful to ask
why non-state actors get involved in international relations in the first
place? In established systems, new actors emerge when there is need for
political authority and private regulation, and an empty institutional space
to fill.117 In such “institutional voids,” the roles, expectations, and
objectives of agencies are unclear, and private action comes in to resolve
the need for regulation, and to increase clarity and transparency.118 These
institutional voids may be intended or unintended.119 States may
deliberately cease certain fields and leave it to private actors to fill in the
gap, or the gap may be the result of unintended independent processes that
create a demand for additional regulation states can’t immediately
deliver.120
Authority issues aside, the practical reality of non-state actors has
overcome prior reflection.121 These actors operate in the international
sphere, shape agendas, and participate in international law making
processes. Their legitimacy is largely tied with their efficacy and outcome.
These non-state actors even go beyond the reach of states in certain aspects
by effecting change and creating new models for behavior, like determining
new standards and policies in human rights, or proposing new
environmental regulations.122
Non-state actors’ involvement in
humanitarian activities has led to the adoption of more and better
humanitarian law and policies by states.123 As non-state actors involvement
in international law making increases, the level of closed-door diplomacy
decreases, making these processes more transparent. Non-state actors
increasingly hold specialized knowledge due to their often-singular
116

Id.
See Bas Arts, Non-State Actors in Global Governance: Three Faces of Power,
2003/4
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See Maarten Hajer, Policy Without Policy? Policy Analysis and the Institutional
Void, 36 POL’Y SCI. 175, 181 (2003).
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Arts, supra note 117.
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Arts, supra note 117, at 34.
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See Richard Langhorne, The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors, 16 DIPL. &
STATECRAFT 331, 331 (2005).
122
See generally Kristine Kern & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities, Europeanization and MultiLevel Governance: Governing Climate Change Through Transnational Municipal
Networks, 47 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 309, 309 (2009).
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See Cenap Cakmak, Civil Society Actors in International Law and World Politics:
Definition, Conceptual Framework, Problems, 6 INT’L J. CIV. SOC’Y L. 7, 30 (2008).
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grassroots experience and relationship to the conditions affecting
communities on the ground.124 This unique perspective renders non-state
actors crucial for holding governments accountable.125 This is particularly
evident on issues of economic development, environmental protection, or
civilian protection from certain categories of weapons such as
antipersonnel landmines.126 Insofar as these non-state actors efficiently fill
in the intended or unintended public authority and regulation gaps of the
state, they gain outcome legitimacy.
It is true that the justification for non-state actors’ exercise of
governance has been “primarily if not exclusively instrumental.”127 Nonstate actors demonstrate that they can provide “benefits that cannot
otherwise be obtained.”128 Brunkhorst argues that non-state actors may
make legitimacy claims based on outcome legitimacy “through the positive
effect [they have] for the people or peoples of the world,” but they lack
process legitimacy due to their lack of democratic participation and
control.129 What is more, non-state actor involvement in international
decision-making has increased the level of scrutiny applied to their process
legitimacy. But how do we evaluate this legitimacy?
The way non-state actors operate and manage themselves, including
their relationship with their constituencies are factors that would normally
apply towards their process legitimacy.130 But unlike democratic states,
non-state actors have no electoral mandate and thus have not been
legitimated by those over whom they claim to exercise political authority.
124

See Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World
Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281, 289 (2004).
125
Tim Büthe, Governance Through Private Authority: Non-State Actors in World
Politics, 58 J. INT’L AFF. 281, 289 (2004).
126
See id.; Asher Alkoby, Non-State Actors and the Legitimacy of International
Environmental Law, 3 NON-STATE ACTORS & INT’L L. 23, 33 (2003) (“By providing
scientific expertise and by exercising their increasing political power, NGOs act to shape the
global environmental agenda. Lack of information and scientific uncertainty often become
barriers to global efforts to combat environmental degradation. This is why in recent years,
NGOs have had the opportunity to play an important role in the processes that led to many
of the conferences where international environmental treaties were negotiated and signed.”);
id. at 26 (“Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), business corporations and other nonstate entities have become increasingly influential in international environmental lawmaking
processes. They initiate international action to address environmental concerns; influence
the negotiating process of treaties and other legal instruments, and help monitor state
compliance with international norms. Yet they are usually not afforded legal status, and
their roles are generally not secured in international institutional arrangements.”).
127
Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFFAIRS 405, 422 (2006).
128
Id.
129
Peters et al., supra note 109, at 225.
130
Matthew Bolton & Thomas Nash, The Role of Middle Power-NGO Coalitions in
Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 172, 181 (2010).
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This objection became known as the “global democratic deficit” of nonstate actors notably after the 1999 Ministerial Conference of the World
Trade Organization when the “international system’s lack of transparency,
accountability, and citizen inclusiveness became a major political issue.”131
This largely shared notion of democratic legitimacy often presumes that the
legitimacy of a government and the legitimacy of a non-state actor are of
the same kind and attach to the same type of relations with their
constituencies. However, the expression of constituencies’ support is
different towards governments and non-state actors. While governments
receive their public support through elections, public support for non-state
actors may be demonstrated through other forms of participation such as
membership, voluntary work, endorsement of their strategies and causes,
financial donations, or even social media following. The origin of such
legitimacy thus differs and attaches to the authority the non-state actor
exerts based on their perceived ability to address a certain type of
institutional void through its specialized knowledge and expertise, or its
exemplary principles and values.132
In a world where non-state actors de facto exercise political authority,
“there is a direct relationship between the relevant global governance
institution and the actors to whom the normative provision is addressed.”133
This not only suggests that non-state actors derive their legitimacy from
their position in the global governance system, but also that the system
itself derives its legitimacy from the link these non-state actors establish
between its institutions and their constituency.134 This legitimacy must be
offered voluntarily; non-state actors cannot force it but rather attract or
inspire it. Their legitimacy will then depend on the period they are capable
of retaining the constituency support, which is not guaranteed for a specific
time unlike that of the elected government. When the non-state actors lose
this support, they then suffer a democratic deficit and cease to be
legitimate.
3. Questions of Accountability
As non-state actors gain more significant institutional power, a natural
question lingers: to whom are they accountable?135 Just like legitimacy,
accountability is also a relational concept that is socially and discursively
131

Andrew L. Strauss, Considering Global Democracy - An Introduction to the
Symposium: Envisioning a More Democratic Global System, 13 WIDENER L. REV. [i], [i]
(2007).
132
DEBORAH D. AVANT ET AL., WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 114 (Deborah D. Avant et
al. eds., 2010).
133
Peters et al., supra note 109, at 232.
134
Arts, supra note 117, at 34.
135
Büthe, supra note 126, at 289.
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constituted. Edwards and Hume define it as “the means by which
individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or
authorities) and are held responsible for their actions.”136 Other scholars
expand this perspective by proposing that accountability is not only about
being “held responsible” by others, but also about “taking responsibility”
for oneself.137 This gives accountability two forms, one external as “an
obligation to meet prescribed standards of behavior,”138 and one internal as
“felt responsibility.”139 The objection that non-state actors’ increasing
influence is disproportionate because of their lack of accountability is an
objection to the role of non-state actors in international law processes. In
assessing this objection, framing is of the essence. The answer to the
question, “are non-state actors currently adequately accountable?”, the
answer is, likely no. But in a world where the role of these actors is not
only identified but also understood, the important question to ask is, “can
non-state actors become adequately accountable, and how?” This is not to
diminish the importance of the accountability critique but to frame the
debate in a more constructive manner.
The earlier “subjects doctrine” issue also speaks to accountability.
Even though non-state actors are granted key roles within legal and
legislative arrangements, their official status under international law
remains uncertain. These actors are still relatively undiscovered since
states “have not yet agreed on a standard for NGOs [and other non-state
actors] operating in the transnational sphere.”140 But the landscape for nonstate actor accountability isn’t as blurry as it may seem. The ILC has
adopted the Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
(RIO)141 setting new baselines regarding wrongful actions,142 consequences
and standards of attribution,143 and reparation.144 The progress made in the
International Organizations sphere suggests that accountability deserves
greater significance and can be fleshed out with the necessary political will
136
Michael Edwards & David Hulme, Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official
Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations, 24 WORLD DEV. 961, 967 (1996).
137
Andrea Cornwall et al., Accountability Through Participation: Developing Workable
Partnership Models in the Health Sector, 31 INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. 1, 3 (2000).
138
Laura B. Chisolm, Accountability of Nonprofit Organizations and Those Who
Control Them: The Legal Framework, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 141, 141 (1995).
139
Ronald E. Fry, Accountability in Organizational Life: Problem or Opportunity for
Nonprofits?, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 181, 181 (1995).
140
Kerstin Martens, Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law, 10 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 23 (2003).
141
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2011/Add.1 (Part 2), at 40 (2011).
142
Id. at Art. 3.
143
Id. at Art. 6–9.
144
Id. at 42, Art. 31.
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and right approach.
NGOs have encountered similar demands for accountability
particularly after the Greenpeace-Brent Spar incident. There, Greenpeace
was criticized for significantly overstating the potential environmental
damage of the Brent Spar oilrig sinking in the North Sea based on a prior
environmental impact assessment.145 Greenpeace was successful in
convincing Shell to dismantle the oilrig on land but it was later discovered
that sinking it would have been a safer and more environmentally friendly
option.146 This episode not only bruised the credibility and reputation of
Greenpeace but also opened up the debate for NGOs’ liability under
international law. On the other hand, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has successfully developed a
“code of conduct,” which includes guidelines on “etiquette, safety, and
participation in meetings” within its “constituency” system for NGOs.147
Despite this development, NGOs, like most other non-state actors, do not
generally incur legal liability for their actions on the international sphere.148
But one may question whether the same type of legal liability is in
fact a possible or even desirable form of accountability, given the nature of
the services and operations some non-state actors provide as public-good
entities, and the possible “unrecoverable costs caused by their resistance
action.”149 This does not mean that NGOs and other non-state actors
should evade all kinds of accountability towards the public, themselves,
and their members. Most public institutions are held to a set of standards,
which may also extend to non-state actors. Accountability mechanisms that
are already in use and can be extended or institutionalized such as reports
and disclosure statements, evaluations, performance assessments, self145

See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 103.
See, for an account of the episode: GRANT JORDAN, SHELL, GREENPEACE AND THE
BRENT SPAR 12 (2001). Greenpeace still defends that recycling was the best option. See
1995 - Shell Reverses Decision to Dump the Brent Spar, GREENPEACE INT’L,
https://www.greenpeace.org/archive-international/en/about/history/Victories-timeline/BrentSpar/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2019). Sinking would, amongst others, be environmentally
friendly, in that it enables coral growth on the decommissioned oil rigs. See Niall Bell &
Jan Smith, Coral Growing on North Sea Oil Rights, 402 NATURE 601, 601 (1999).
147
UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE SECRETARIAT, GUIDELINES FOR THE
PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT
MEETINGS OF THE BODIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 2–5 (Mar. 2003). See BARBARA K. WOODWARD, GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 311
(2010).
148
RAINER HOFMANN & NILS GEISSLER, NON-STATE ACTORS AS NEW SUBJECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (1999).
149
REPHAEL HAREL BEN-ARI, THE LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PRESENT INITIATIVES (1912-2012)
60 (2013).
146
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regulation, and social audits are different types of accountability
mechanisms that may better fit the different qualities of non-state actors. In
the event that these actors fail to meet their standards, they may become
subject to sanctions, such as the shrinking size of their membership or
support base, the reduction of their financial resources, the shaming and
attack on their reputation in the eyes of their peers and public opinion, and
decreased media attention and exposure.150 The Global Accountability
Index is one of the relatively new initiatives that measures and compares
the accountability of transnational actors including non-state actors based
on their transparency, evaluation, participation, and complaint response
mechanisms.151 Empirically measuring accountability helps shift the
debate into the right direction, from a purely theoretical one to that of
tangible analysis and effect.
Like the legitimacy objection, the
accountability skepticism is certainly present and valid. Instead of
discounting non-state actors and their involvement altogether, however, the
more constructive shift is to assess how and in what forms accountability
may expand to them.
III. MANNERS OF CONNECTION IN NETWORKS
A. Short Introduction to Network Theory and Analysis
To establish the framework and the tools that allow us to see
international law differently, we need a different kind of perspective and a
new methodological approach. The first step we took to this end was to
undertake a conceptual shift regarding the kind of structures in which
contemporary international law making takes place. The previous part
prepared us to view the international system as a web of multiple actors and
networks instead of only states as unitary hierarchical actors. In this world,
the development of international law is not limited to the boundaries of
sovereign power but depends upon the connection, density, and intensity of
ties across these boundaries, and among actors.152 To achieve this shift of
our perspective and analysis, this part sets up the methodological
framework within which we can examine networks as structures in and of
themselves, but also networks as actors in a larger international networked
system.153 That is because agency and structure are viewed as deeply
intertwined and interdependent. Giddens describes this interdependence as
the duality of structure, “according to [which] the structural properties of
150

Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of Non-State
Actors in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 119 (2013).
151
Peters et al., supra note 109, at 279.
152
See Bianchi, supra note 86, at 41 n.7.
153
SLAUGHTER, supra note 71, at 34.
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social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they
recursively organize.”154 Agency is bound by structures at the same time as
agency brings about and changes those structures that determine the
conditions of action.155 Analyzing networks of international law making as
structures will help us assess how the structure of the network affects the
actors within the international law making processes. Examining networks
as actors will shed light on the role and impact networks have on the
making of international law when they interact with other actors or
networks.
Researchers across disciplines have, over the years, also developed a
set of tools for understanding networks through analyzing and modeling
them. These tools are mathematical, statistical, and computational, and tell
us something about a network that may not be visible to the naked eye. In
this Part, I will introduce the basic tools used to describe and analyze
networks that can be helpful in the process of analyzing international
legislative action. Often, these tools start from a simple representation of
the network and proceed with a series of calculations that answer different
questions such as which actors are best connected, how actors cluster
together, and even whether and how resources, information, or normative
prescriptions emerge and diffuse in a network. These tools exist in the
abstract and may be applied to any system that we can represent in network
form. But not all of these tools are useful every time—rather, their
usefulness is largely dependent on the network and specific questions the
researcher poses. What these measurements and calculations represent,
however, is the available toolbox that we can use to address most enquiries
in the process of understanding networks in general, and the networks
involved in international law making in particular. Most of these tools
come from social network analysis and its application of graph theory, the
branch of mathematics that addresses networks.156
First, social network analysis is a collection of ideas, measures, and
tools for relational analysis designed to understand the most important
features of social structures.157 Researchers often use it to explore social
relations and structures to better conceptualize and organize them but also
to understand their material outcomes.158 The indispensable elements of all
networks are actors with relations that represent any contact, connection, or

154

ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 25 (1984).
See COLIN WIGHT, AGENTS, STRUCTURES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POLITICS
AS ONTOLOGY 101 (2006).
156
See ALI KAVEH, OPTIMAL ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURES BY CONCEPTS OF SYMMETRY
AND REGULARITY 15 (2013).
157
JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: A HANDBOOK 85 (3d ed. 2017).
158
Id.
155
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tie between any of at least two of them.159 Social network analysis focuses
on these relationships as they are defined as links among certain nodes.
After introducing the basics of social network analysis, I address its metrics
for quantifying network structure and discuss some of the most relevant
patterns that networks reveal when we apply these social network analysis
metrics to the study of networks in international law making.
Second, graph theory comes in to analyze and visualize these
connections. Graphs are the mathematical structures used to portray
pairwise relations between actors.160 Remember the seven bridges of the
Koningsberg problem? Well, graph theory has made leaps and bounds
since Euler’s graph assisted with this problem’s solution. The main
advantage of graphs is their powerful way of representing structured
data.161 Graph visualizations thus represent the nodes and links of a
network in a way that promotes easier understanding of the structures and
relationships represented by the graph. Graph theory will help us transform
our multi-dimensional world and its phenomena into a two-dimensional
graph of nodes (actors) and edges (links), to quantify these relationships,
and to formalize their properties through algorithms. This Article only
includes a fraction of graph theory’s tools, focusing on the ones that are
most relevant to the study of networks responsible for the making of
international law. Seeing this different perspective of the world allows us
to understand the wide spectrum of actors, structures, and designs involved
in international law making today.
Sociologists first used social network analysis to explain social
behavior by examining the structural patterns of community ties,
hypothesizing that these patterns determined the social behavior of the
actors involved.162 Social network analysis undertakes as the primary unit
of inquiry the social relation that connects members in a social system
instead of the agents themselves. It is grounded on the intuitive idea that
the patterns of social ties that actors are embedded in have important
consequences for those actors, and are able to shape their perceptions,
attitudes, and actions.163 Wasserman and Faust have proposed the four

159

DAVID KNOKE & SONG YANG, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 6–7 (2d ed. 2008).
FABRIZIO DE VICO FALLANI & FABIO BABILONI, THE GRAPH THEORETICAL APPROACH
IN BRAIN FUNCTIONAL NETWORKS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 13 (2010).
161
Horst Bunke & Michel Neuhaus, Graph Matching—Exact and Error-Tolerant
Methods and the Automatic Learning of Edit Costs, in MINING GRAPH DATA 17, 17 (Diane J.
Cook & Lawrence B. Holder eds., 2006).
162
Barry Wellman, Studying Personal Communities, in SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND
NETWORK ANALYSIS 61, 63–64 (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982).
163
Linton C. Freeman, The Development of Social Network Analysis: A Study in the
Sociology of Science, 27 SOC. NETWORKS 377 (2005); KNOKE & YANG, supra note 159, at
63–64.
160
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broadly accepted principles of social network analysis:164 (1) the agents and
their actions are not autonomous or independent but rather
interdependent;165 (2) the ties between nodes are the channels through
which material or non-material resources flow;166 (3) the structures of the
network may constrain or enable agents’ individual action;167 and (4)
network structures may be studied as long-term patterns among the
individual nodes.168 This framework allows for an empirical calculation of
the relationships involved, a mapping of these relationships on the basis of
connection, a tangible display of the effects these relationships produce
within and for the network, and an evaluation of the network structure as a
whole.169
Perhaps the most important benefit of social networks analysis is its
ability to escape the narrow vision of the actor-centered analysis we often
encounter in international law. Instead of focusing only on the attributes of
a single actor or a given number of actors, it targets the associations among
these actors,170 and their ability to enable or constrain agents.171 In this
way, social network analysis complements already existing methods by
offering an additional lens that focuses on actors’ associations. By
proposing that patterned relations among actors influence social entities
beyond their individual attributes, social network analysis can infuse a
theoretical framework with an empirical basis for the sources and effects of
social action, including that leading to international law making. 172 By
making use of statistical analysis and applying the quantitative tools of
linear algebra and graph theory to the identification of organizational
structures and their effects,173 social network analysis exposes our
framework for understanding international law making to an entirely new
dimension.

164
STANLEY WASSERMAN &
AND APPLICATIONS 4, 8 (2004).

KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: METHODS

165
Id.; see also Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562; Scott D. Gest & Thomas A.
Kindermann, Analysis of Static Social Networks and Their Developmental Effects, in
HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL RESEARCH METHODS 577, 580 (Brett Laursen et al. eds.,
2012).
166
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; HafnerBurton et al., supra note 88, at 562.
167
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; HafnerBurton et al., supra note 88, at 562.
168
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4; Wellman, supra note 162; HafnerBurton et al., supra note 88, at 562.
169
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562–63.
170
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 562.
171
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 88, at 560.
172
IAN MCCULLOH ET AL., SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS WITH APPLICATIONS 13 (2013).
173
Id.
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But just like all research methods, social network analysis has its
limitations. Its primary limitation stems from the realization that the social
and, by extension, the legal worlds, consist of more than just social
structures.174 Social network analysis is constrained to addressing
structural relations.175 Yet many of the issues that relate to the study of
social action require an additional set of analytical tools to address aspects
that are not as easily quantifiable. For example, intention, rationality, or
subjectivity within social environments may influence networks, but these
factors are more difficult for social network analysis to assess alone.176 But
even though social network analysis has some analytical limitations, it is
open to complement and be complemented by other differently limited
approaches.177 Because of its generality and flexibility, social network
analysis can cut across the boundaries of traditional discipline distinction
without becoming antagonistic with other disciplines or methods.178 For
instance, as social network analysis does not have data collection methods
specific to it, it borrows data collection methodologies from other
disciplines.179 This disciplinary fluidity and the versatility of its methods
and tools allow social network analysis to address some of the most
complex aspects of social structure and the attributes of individual actors
that arise from their relations with others.180
In social sciences, social network analysis has become a strong
methodology that complements standard statistical analysis. It has been
defined, applied, and tested in several research fields from anthropology
and sociology to organizational behavior and history.181 An “organized
174

JOHN SCOTT, WHAT IS SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS? 85 (2012).
See David Knoke & Song Yang, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 4–6 (2008).
176
SCOTT, supra note 174; See e.g., Dharshana Kasthurirathna, Michael Harre, and
Mahendra Piraveenan, Influence modelling using bounded rationality in social networks, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2015 IEEE/ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADVANCES IN
SOCIAL NETWORKS ANALYSIS AND MINING 2015 33–4 (Jian Pei, Fabrizio Silvestri, and Jie
Tang eds. 2015).
177
SCOTT, supra note 174, at 86; See generally KNOKE & YANG, supra note 159.
178
LINTON C. FREEMAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 4 (2004)
(“The network field has developed important applications in research on: ‘. . . the study of
occupational mobility, the impact of urbanization on individuals, the world political and
economic system, community decision-making, social support, community, group problemsolving, diffusion, corporate interlocking, belief systems, social cognition, markets,
sociology of science, exchange and power, consensus and social influence, and coalition
formation . . . primate studies, computer-mediated communication, intra- and interorganizational studies, and marketing . . . health and illness, particularly AIDS.’”).
179
Stephen T. Ricken et al., Tell Us Who: Guided Social Network Data Collection,
PROC. 43RD HAWAII INT’L CONF. SYS. SCI. 1 (2010).
180
Robert Hanneman & Mark Riddle, Centrality and Power, INTRODUCTION TO SOC.
NETWORK METHODS (2005), https://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/.
181
AJITH ABRAHAM ET AL., COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS: TRENDS,
TOOLS AND RESEARCH ADVANCES 135 (2009).
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paradigm” for a social network analysis enquiry includes an initial
structural intuition based on relations that link actors, a strong set of
empirical data, reliance on mathematical and computational models,
development of graphic imagery and its analysis through visualization.182
In social network analysis, regardless of whether one is collecting data on
larger or smaller networks, one must specify a “boundary” that establishes
which actors and relations are included within the network and which ones
are excluded.183 Without this boundary specification, particularly in larger
networks, the number of possible links could increase exponentially as the
number of actors increases. This could threaten to both outstrip the ability
of the researcher to collect all necessary data and, in particularly large
networks, the ability of the hardware and software to process this data
computationally.
B. Why International Law, Why Now?
What do these methods have to offer to international law making?
First, the tools of network theory help us quantify and map actors’ and
networks’ contributions to international legislative processes.
This
descriptive project allows us to clearly map and understand the wide
spectrum of actors, structures, and designs involved in international law
making. It provides a means to quantify the impact and effect of these
actors individually and collectively on the making of international law
irrespective of their de jure status in international legislative action and
fora. In other words, this allows us to map states and non-state actors and
investigate their actual, instead of expected, contribution to international
legislative processes. Finally, network theory can help us to tailor
networked solutions to existing international problems so that international
legislative action can be more effective.
International law addresses problems that have triggered international
legislative action requiring coordination, collaboration, regulation,
allocation of resources, responsiveness to threats against the network and
the network’s actors, as well as means of normative enforcement and
accountability. Network theory will help us map and examine the types of
networks that emerge to address these problems through international
legislative action, allowing us to recognize the full spectrum of actors
involved in international law making and their precise effect. This will
offer an empirical basis for current discussions on the role of various actors
in international law, including their normative contribution and effect as
well as their levels of de facto recognition by other actors of the
182

FREEMAN, supra note 178, at 3.
Edward O. Laumann et al., The Boundary Specification Problem in Network
Analysis, in RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 61 (1989).
183
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international system. Thus, these methods make descriptive analytical
contributions to international law.
These methods also serve a more prescriptive analytical function for
international law. A key question in the study of networks in international
law is whether and under what terms networks are more effective at
addressing problems through legislative processes than the other two
existing structural forms of markets and hierarchies.184 Network analysis
not only allows us to measure and map the dynamics of actors in networks
but also provides the springboard on which to build new frameworks for
international legislative action. Network analysis paints a much clearer
picture of whom to call upon when putting forward a legislative agenda,
when to introduce a normative prescription on the basis of the legislative
network’s social capital,185 and how to best diffuse it based on the actors
involved in each legislative process. Network analysis also helps us
determine the most powerful actors or the leaders in various legislative
networks, and to quantify the effect of their position to normative
development. Finally, network analysis allows us to map how actors
influence each other’s normative preferences and outcomes, the preferences
and outcomes of their networks and other networks, how these actors are
likely to act based on the structures they are embedded in, and what they
learn from each other. Understanding and integrating these insights is
critical to mapping existing international legislative action and prescribing
the means to enact successful international legislative action in the future.
And why use these methods in international law now? For decades,
quantitative methods in international law boiled down to some primary
datasets collected in the field of human rights and analyzed statistically
from print or analogue datasets.186 This was, in part, due to the scarcity of
data and the difficulties of obtaining it at the time, and, in part, due to the
narrower approach of traditional legal method. But data today has become
an increasingly important driver of empirical legal research. The catch-all
term “big data” refers to the exponential growth of available data as a
product of increasing connectivity through the digital revolution.187
184

See Slaughter, supra note 71, at 36.
See generally JOHN SCOTT, SOCIAL NETWORKS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY
103 (2002); see generally JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990).
186
Antoine Nouvet & Frederic Megret, Quantitative Methods for Human Rights: From
Statistics to “Big Data”, RES. METHODOLOGIES LEGAL HUM. RTS. SCHOLARSHIP (2017).
187
Various strict quantitative definitions exist (for example: a dataset with over a billion
data nodes). Various qualitative definitions exist (such as the dataset’s approximation to
capturing the entire data population we intend to measure, or the inability for typical
database software tools to process data because it is too large, unstructured, and complex.
This chapter emphasizes the importance of the digital. This is similar with the UN
OHCHR’s definition: “Extremely large data sets associated with new information
technology and which can be analyzed computationally to reveal possible patterns, trends
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Conceptually, big data in legal research is associated with three primary
factors: First, the levels of connectivity and information diffusion through
the internet have dramatically increased. Next, more than ever before, the
advancements in search engines and creation of big databases and
repositories are at the disposal of legal scholars. That is why researchers
are beginning to become increasingly aware of their ability to treat primary
material in the legal discipline as data. Finally, the increased interaction of
international law with other disciplines provides international law
researchers with new sets of methods and tools for processing large
amounts of data, and introduces new approaches to legal enquiry that were
less attractive in the past due to scarcity of such data or decreased ability to
process it.
1. The Basic Network Properties
In the previous part, a network was defined as a collection of actors
called nodes connected by links of relations called edges. When
researchers represent networks in Figures, like Figure 1 below, circles
represent nodes and lines connecting circles represent edges. A network is
also called a “graph” in the language of mathematics. Mathematically, I
will abbreviate a graph 𝐺 as 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸), where 𝑉 is the set of nodes and 𝐸
is the set of edges. Then |𝑉| is the total number of nodes, and |𝐸| is the
total number of edges in the graph 𝐺. If 𝑢 and 𝑣 are two nodes belonging
to graph 𝐺, and there is an edge from 𝑢 to 𝑣, then I write that (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸,
and say that 𝑣 is a neighbor of 𝑢. For simplicity, I write (𝑢, 𝑣) to represent
the link between 𝑢 and 𝑣, and also write (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐺 to indicate that u and v
are linked in and belong to (∈) the network 𝐺.

Figure 1

and correlations.” A Human Rights-Based Approach to Data, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
(2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRIndicators/GuidanceNoteonApproachtoData.p
df.
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There are many ways to mathematically represent a network.
Consider the network in Figure 1 above. It has a given number of nodes
that is 𝑛 = 5. If we denote an edge between nodes 1 and 3 by (1,3) then
we can describe the complete network by giving the specific number of
nodes and a list of all edges. In the network above this is 𝑛 = 5 nodes and
edges (1,3), (2,3), (3,4), (3,5), and (4,5). This representation of the edges
is called an “edge list” and is useful in storing the data of a network to
further analyze computationally. Networks may be directed or undirected
depending on whether their edges are directed or undirected. A directed
edge means that the edge has an orientation that is typically represented by
using an arrow in the graph. In a directed graph, each edge has a certain
direction pointing from one node to another node. We may think of
directed edges as one-way streets so when traversing a directed edge from
node to node we must always travel down the edge as prescribed by the
arrow direction. Mathematically, a graph is directed if for any edge a,
𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ≠ 𝑎𝑣,𝑢 and undirected if 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 = 𝑎𝑣,𝑢 for all 𝑢, 𝑣 ∈ |𝑉|. Notice the
difference between Figures 1 and 2. Figure 2 below is a directed graph
because the edges connecting its nodes indicate the direction with the
arrows, while Figure 1 above is an undirected graph.

Figure 2

Another way to represent a network is its adjacency matrix. The
adjacency matrix is a matrix that describes a graph by representing which
nodes are adjacent to which other nodes in the graph. Two nodes are
adjacent if they are joined by an edge 𝑎. A graph can then be described by
its adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ). This is a square |𝑉| × |𝑉| matrix with 𝑉
representing the number of nodes in the graph, where each row and column
corresponds to a node of graph 𝐺. In this matrix, 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ∈ {0,1} represents
the availability of an edge from node 𝑢 to node 𝑣. To make the adjacency
matrix of a graph we need to start by counting the number of nodes in the
graph. Let us take the undirected network in Figure 1 above again. The
graph has five nodes, so we need to make our adjacency matrix of size 5 by
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5. To make this clearer, we can put the names of the nodes on the top and
side of the matrix:
1 2 3 4 5
0
0
𝐴=
1
0
[ 0

0
0
1
0
0

1
3
0
1
1

0
0
1
0
1

0
𝟏
0
𝟐
1
𝟑
1
𝟒
0 ]𝟓

Edges in a network represent the presence of a connection between
nodes. Absence of an edge also indicates absence of connection between
two nodes. In other words, either that connection exists, or it does not. We
represent this by giving these edges binary values based on connection or
no connection between two nodes. There are other instances, however, in
which the connection itself can give us more information. There is a way
to represent edges as having a certain weight or value to them such as, for
instance, the amount of data flowing within the edges of an internet
network, or the frequency of telephone calls among friends in a social
network. In these cases, the edge weight 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 > 0 can take on non-binary
values to represent the intensity of the interaction. This means that a graph
is a “weighted graph.” In the adjacency matrix, we represent this feature
by giving the elements of the matrix values beyond 0, 1 equal to the
corresponding weight in the connection. When we visualize a graph, we
have additional means to represent these quantified variables. In the
instance of weight in a graph, we represent it by increasing or decreasing
the size or intensity of the color of an edge connecting two nodes. The
larger or more intense the edge between two nodes, the higher the weight
of that interaction. Also, by extension, the larger or more intense the size
or color of a node is, the higher the weight of that node.
When two nodes are connected through a consecutive pair of edges,
this represents a “path” in a network. Paths are routes across the graph that
run from node to node and represent at least a “two-edge sequence.” In
Figure 3, the bolder sequence of edges along four nodes represents a path.

Figure 3
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The adjacency matrix entries can tell us for every node 𝑣 which nodes are
within distance 1 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 or in other words connected by an edge to 𝑣. To
calculate the number of two-step sequences between node u and node v in a
graph with adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ) we calculate for 𝐴2 for two nodes
(𝑢, 𝑣) with 𝑢 ≠ 𝑣 in,
𝐴2 = ∑ 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 𝑎𝑣,𝑢
𝑣,𝑢∈𝑉

If 𝐴2 ≠ 0 then 𝑢 can be reached from 𝑣 within two steps; 𝑢 is within
distance 2 of 𝑣. Higher powers can be interpreted similarly. For example,
if we wanted to calculate the number of three steps, we would have to raise
the adjacency matrix A to the third power of 𝐴3 , perform the same
calculation, and so forth. But aside from regular paths, there is also one
path that represents the shortest path available in a network between any
two nodes. This path is called a “geodesic path.” Naturally, the length of
the geodesic path, called the “geodesic distance,” represents the shortest
distance between two nodes in a network.
Networks can also be complete or incomplete. For a complete
network, the graph is such that every pair of nodes is joined by an edge.
The degree 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑣 of a node 𝑣 is the number of edges which involve 𝑣 as an
endpoint, in other words that are connected to it. This degree can be
calculated from the adjacency matrix,
deg(𝑣) = ∑ 𝑎𝑢,𝑣
𝑢

.

Figure 4

The average degree of a graph then is the average of its node degrees. For
instance, in Figure 4, the average degree of node 5 is 3.
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The units of analysis in social network analysis represent the varying
interactions that link each pair of nodes in the system. The form and
content of these linkages directly relate to the properties of the network
connections.188 The links among nodes are not random and their
components may reveal distinct substructures within the network as well as
particular roles that actors occupy. Identifying, analyzing, and measuring
this form and content is part of the necessary methodological task of social
network analysis.189 The variations of network form and content can
explain both observed behavior of nodes in the system as well as the social
system itself.190 To best quantify these variations, social network analysis
employs a set of metrics as standards for evaluating form and content.
2. The Basic Network Metrics
Being introduced to the nomenclature of network theory and to a set
of useful features that capture important aspects of the network structure
will improve our understanding of the fundamental structural properties of
a network. While a graph can provide a visual for a network that we can
compare to other graphs with a quick glimpse, larger networks can be more
difficult to envision and describe. To describe and compare these
networks, we use a set of quantitative measures that represent some of the
networks’ properties. Most of these concepts and metrics derive from
social network analysis and its application in sociological enquiry. A
widely-varied number of other disciplines, however, have adopted most of
these tools so that they are now considered part of the basic network
toolbox.191 I have selected for discussion some of the measures that are
useful in analyzing the network data and in revealing important patterns
and features of the international law networks.
i. Centrality
Social scientists have long proposed that power is a fundamental
property of social structures.192 In the study of networked structures, power
is inherently relational. The different patterns of relations within networks
vest power in different actors and result in varied amounts of power in
social structures we study as networks. Social network analysis provides a
188

SCOTT, supra note 157, at 67.
RONALD S. BURT, TOWARD A STRUCTURAL THEORY OF ACTION: NETWORK MODELS
OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE, PERCEPTION AND ACTION 22 (1982).
190
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 67.
191
See, e.g., Blaine J. Cole, Dominance Hierarchies in Leptothorax Ants, 212 SCI.
83−84 (1981).
192
Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777−95 (1982); DAVE
ELDER‐VASS, THE CAUSAL POWER OF SOCIAL STRUCTURES: EMERGENCE, STRUCTURE AND
AGENCY 1 (2010).
189
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set of concrete tools to approach the notion of power as attached to
structural positions of actors within social relations. The metric that social
network analysis uses to describe and measure power is “centrality.”193
Centrality measures the rough social power of a node based on its
connectivity to the rest of the network.194 It is based on the fundamental
premise that the way a node is embedded in the network on the basis of its
relations with other nodes impose constrains on that node and offer
opportunities.195 Those nodes that face fewer constraints and have more
opportunities are in structurally favorable positions over other nodes in the
network.196 These favorable positions may lead to quicker or more
numerous exchanges and greater influence, and may turn a node into a
focal point in the network, particularly in relation to other nodes that are in
less favored positions.197
Knoke defines this “network centrality” as “prominence in networks
where valued information and scarce resources are transferred from one
actor to another.”198 Centrality measures explain actor positions within a
network including the importance and influence their position entails.199
For instance, a node with high centrality may enjoy easier access to
resources or information as opposed to other network nodes. This type of
social power does not only allow an actor to access network resources but
also increases its influence and effect over network flows. Such a central
node would be better positioned to propose, shape, or alter the common
interests or norms of the network. In the case of international legislative
action, these nodes would be the actors that are key in proposing or shaping
normative prescriptions, and those nodes that garner high influence in
pushing these prescriptions forward. One of the key goals of analyzing a
network is to determine who the most important or central actor in this
network is irrespective of their de jure status in international law. But there
are many ways to understand the notion of “importance,” and network
analysis represents these various conceptions in its many measures for
centrality. Centrality measures of degree, betweenness, closeness, and

193

MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 52.
See Id.
195
See Robert Hanneman & Mark Riddle, Centrality and Power, in INTRODUCTION TO
SOCIAL NETWORK METHODS (Robert Hanneman ed., 2005).
196
See Id.
197
Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180, at 7.
198
DAVID KNONK, POLITICAL NETOWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE,
STRUCTURAL ANLAYSIS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1990); See also Linton Freeman,
Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOCIAL NETWORKS 215−39
(1979); Karen S. Cook et al., The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and
Experimental Results, 89 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 275−305 (1983).
199
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 52.
194
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eigenvector can tell us how much influence agents have within their
network.200
One of the simplest but most illuminating centrality measures in a
network is “degree centrality.” Degree centrality measures the network
activity of each node using the concept of degrees, or the number of direct
connections of a node. In other words, degree centrality represents the
amount of links each node has with other nodes in the network – it is the
sum of all links connected to a node.201 The more links an actor has, the
more power it may have. In directed networks, the number of links going
into a node represents “in-degree” centrality, while the number of links
originating from it represents “out-degree” centrality.202
In-degree
centrality is a measure of importance. A node that receives many ties
because other nodes seek to link with it is considered prominent. Actors
with high out-degree centrality on the other hand are often characterized as
influential because they can exchange with others more easily or disperse
information more quickly to other nodes in the network.203
Mathematically, we can calculate degree centrality for node 𝑣,
𝑑𝑣
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑣 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ
𝑛−1
Based on their degree centrality, nodes with the most ties to other
actors hold a special place of influence within the network.204 These nodes
are also likely to be less dependent on other nodes in the network.205 For
instance, in a social network, individuals with many connections to others
often have more access to people or resources, more influence over other
nodes or in the network, and more clout than those with fewer connections.
In a network with directed ties, the larger a node’s in-degree centrality is,
particularly deriving from nodes with high in-degree centrality themselves,
the more popular or influential a node is likely to be.206 For instance, a
graphic representation of a widely cited scientific paper that effectively
represents the measure of the paper’s in-degree centrality in a citation
network provides a way to assess the paper’s influence and represents one
of the most widely used manners of assessing academic research.
200
Id. See also Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structures 7 HUM.
ORG. 16 (1948); Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual
Clarification, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 215−39 (1978).
201
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 34.
202
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 29.
203
See HANNEMAN & RIDDLE, supra note 195, at ch. 10.
204
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 33.
205
See Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180.
206
Hubert Buch-Hansen, Social Network Analysis and Critical Realism, 44 J. THEORY
SOC. BEHAV. 309 (2014).
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Hafner-Burton and Montgomery posit that actors with higher degree
centrality in the international system can “withhold social benefits such as
membership and recognition or enact social sanctions such as
marginalization as a method of coercion” and would “expect additional
support in a conflict.”207 Beckfield argues that actors “with privileged
positions in the world polity are able, to a significant degree, to set
agendas, frame debates, and promulgate policies that benefit them.”208 The
metrics and tools designed to rank nodes based on their position in the
network are essential for analyzing and understanding aspects of centrality,
interpreting the prominence of a node in a social structure.209
The related metric of “eigenvector centrality” provides a more
nuanced approach to degree centrality. While degree centrality determines
influence through a simple measure of links per actor, eigenvector
centrality is premised on the idea that not all links are of equal value.
Links to nodes that are themselves very highly connected will give a
certain node more influence than links to nodes that are less connected.210
A node will have high eigenvector centrality if it is connected to other
highly connected nodes. In other words, the importance of a node likely
increases if it is connected to other nodes that are themselves important.
Eigenvector centrality is strictly dependent on the degree centrality of the
nodes to which a node connects. Instead of awarding nodes one numerical
point per connection, it gives each node a numerical score that is
proportional to the sum of the scores of the other nodes it connects with.211
Because of their connectedness to such highly connected nodes, nodes with
high eigenvector centrality are also particularly influential nodes in the
network.212
Mathematically, beginning with the adjacency matrix 𝐴 = (𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ),
where 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 ∈ {0,1} represents the availability of an edge from node 𝑢 to
node 𝑣
𝑎𝑢,𝑣 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝐸

207
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Alexander H. Montgomery, Power Positions:
International Organizations, Social Networks, and Conflict, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 11
(2006).
208
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Network Analysis for International Relations, 63
INT’L ORG. 570 (2009).
209
Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structures, 7 HUM. ORG. 16 (1948);
Freeman, supra note 200, at 215; Ulrik Brandes, A Faster Algorithm for Betweenness
Centrality, 25 J. MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 163 (2001).
210
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 46.
211
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 40.
212
MCCULLOH ET AL., supra note 172, at 34.
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1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒
}
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑠 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒

The eigenvector centrality of a node is proportional to the sum of the
centralities of the nodes to which it is connected. Suppose that 𝜆 is the
larger eigenvalue of 𝐴 and 𝑛 is the number of nodes in a graph:
𝑛

𝐴𝑥 = 𝜆𝑥,

𝜆𝑥𝑢 = ∑ 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 𝑥𝑣 , 𝑢 = 1, . . . , 𝑛
𝑢=1

The metric of “betweenness centrality” captures how well situated a
node is in terms of the paths it lies on. It represents the extent to which a
node lies between other nodes in the same network.213 In other words,
betweenness centrality reflects the number of nodes each node connects to
indirectly through its edges.214 A node with high betweenness centrality
has significant influence over what flows between nodes in the network and
can thus control the network’s outcomes.
Betweenness centrality
effectively measures the number of times a node acts as an intermediary, or
a bridge, along the shortest path between any other two points.
A node with high betweenness centrality may access or control the
flow of information or resources to other nodes in the network because of
the “structural hole” it fills, a hole that would otherwise exist between the
two other actors that this node connects.215 In other words, when two
nodes in a network would normally be structurally disconnected, this node
serves as a connecting point between them, as a bridge. Betweenness
centrality measures how often one given node serves as a bridge in a
network.216 Because betweenness centrality indicates the amount of control
an actor has over what passes through to other nodes of the network, 217 a
node with high betweenness centrality can fill a large number of these
structural holes in a network and may play an important role in the
network’s structure despite not having high degree centrality.218
Betweenness centrality was introduced to quantify the control one
person may have on the communication among other people in a social
network.219 Suppose we have a social network in which rumors are being
213

WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 4.
Id.
215
See RONALD S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION
65 (1992).
216
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 47–48.
217
Id.
218
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 42.
219
Linton C. Freeman, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based upon Betweenness, 40
SOCIOMETRY 36, 40 (1977); Jac M. Anthonisse, The Rush in a Directed Graph, STICHTING
214
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passed from one person to another. Let us assume that every pair of nodes
in this network exchanges a message with equal probability per unit time.
Nodes with higher betweenness centrality are the ones through which the
largest number of messages pass making them privy to the highest amount
of information in this network. These nodes have considerable influence in
the network by virtue of the control over information passing to other
nodes. Removal of these nodes will also cause the most disruption in this
network by severing the paths on which so many of these messages flow.
Power in betweenness is premised on the capacity of an actor to broker
contacts among other actors, to prevent such contacts, or to isolate actors.
In the context of international law making, nodes with higher betweenness
centrality can be those key actors that facilitate the information sharing and
normative diffusion within a network. Similarly, they are also the actors
whose absence may suggest lower levels of information exchange or higher
levels of disruptions in normative diffusion.
Mathematically, betweenness centrality can be represented as,
𝜎𝑢,𝑤 (𝑣)
𝐶𝑣 = ∑
,
𝜎𝑢,𝑤
𝑣≠𝑢≠𝑤∈𝑉

where 𝐶𝑣 is the betweeness centrality value at node 𝑣, 𝜎𝑢,𝑤 (𝑣) is the
number of shortest paths between nodes 𝑢 and 𝑤 that pass through the node
𝑣, and 𝜎𝑢,𝑤 is the number of shortest paths between node 𝑢 and 𝑤.
The last measure of centrality I introduce here is closeness centrality,
which is used as a measurement of “global centrality.” Closeness centrality
reflects the distance between elements in a defined network space. While
two nodes may have fewer connections than other nodes, the pattern of
their links may allow them to access all nodes in the network more quickly
and efficiently than other nodes.220 This closeness allows these nodes to
better monitor the network’s flow. Closeness centrality quantifies how
quickly a node can reach all the other nodes of the network by measuring
the mean distance from a node to other nodes. Closeness centrality also
represents the influence range of a node by assessing the set of nodes that
are reachable from that node. Closeness centrality is higher for nodes that
are separated from other nodes only by a shorter distance on average.
In a social network, a person with lower average distance will find it
easier and faster to reach others in the network than someone with higher
average distance. Closeness is the inverse of the sum of the shortest
distances between each node and every other node in the network. The
way to measure this is by calculating the aggregate distance from each
MATHEMATISCH CENTRUM. MATHEMATISCHE BESLISKUNDE BN 9/71 (1971).
220
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 49.

BANTEKA (DO NOT DELETE)

382

11/14/2019 5:19 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:339

node to all other nodes in the network. This can tell us how close a node is
likely to be to any other randomly selected node in the network. 221 The
node that has the lowest aggregate distance is the most central network
point with the highest closeness centrality. The nodes with the highest
measure of closeness centrality are the ones with the best view of what is
happening in this network.222 Power based on closeness is linked to
exchange and bargaining but also to the ability of actors to exert power by
serving as the focal point whose views influence a larger number of actors
within the network.
To calculate closeness centrality mathematically, suppose that 𝑑𝑢𝑣 is
the length of a geodesic path from node 𝑢 to node 𝑣 and 𝑛 the number of
nodes in a network. As mentioned earlier, a geodesic path is the shortest
path available in a network between any two nodes and the length of the
geodesic path, called the geodesic distance, represents the shortest distance
between two nodes in a graph. The mean geodesic distance 𝑙 from 𝑢 to 𝑣,
averaged over all nodes 𝑛 in the network is,
1
𝑙𝑢 = ∑ 𝑑𝑢𝑣
𝑛
𝑣

The mean distance 𝑙 between this pair of nodes (𝑢, 𝑣),
1
1
𝑙𝑢𝑣 = 2 ∑ 𝑑𝑢𝑣 = ∑ 𝑙𝑢
𝑛
𝑛
𝑢𝑣

𝑢

And the closeness centrality for node 𝑣 is
𝑛−1
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑙(𝑢, 𝑣) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑢 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣
∑𝑢≠𝑣 𝑙(𝑢, 𝑣)
ii. Connectivity
While centrality helps identify power in a network, connectivity helps
us answer questions of how connected parts of the network are to one
another and to measure the resilience of a network against disruptions.
Some networks of individuals are well-connected and are therefore more
cohesive, and others are not. In the social networks we engage with daily,
certain people have more connections than others. More connections often
result in more exposure to information, experience, or resources and make
highly-connected individuals more influential. High rates of connection
within groups also lead to, for example, a quicker spread of information
221
222

SCOTT, supra note 157, at 42.
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 49.
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within the group or more and faster mobilization of actors in the face of a
problem that requires solution.
Connectivity is often defined as the set of mechanisms, processes,
systems and relationships that link individuals and collectives by
facilitating material, informational, or social exchange.223 It includes
physical, technological, as well as social interactions and their outcomes.224
In a network, a pair of nodes is said to be connected when linked directly or
indirectly by an unbroken path.225 If it is possible to establish a path from
any node to any other node in the network, then the network is connected.
If it is impossible to connect all nodes with at least one other node in the
network, the network is disconnected. The aggregate connectivity of a
network is the average cumulative fraction of the nodes reached as the
steps performed by nodes to connect to other nodes approach infinity. The
more connected a network is, the more likely it is for a random pair of
nodes to be connected to one another.226
The connectivity of individual nodes within a network typically
varies. Based on their relative connectivity, nodes can be distinguished as
hubs and non-hubs. Hubs are those nodes that are connected to most other
nodes in the network.227 Removing a hub or hubs from a network can
cause significant levels of fragmentation in this network. 228 Nodes connect
through paths. The average shortest path length describes how “globally
connected” a graph is. Mathematically, a path from node 𝑣0 to node 𝑣𝑛
takes the form of an alternating sequence of nodes 𝑣 and edges 𝑒,
(𝑣𝑜 , 𝑒1 , 𝑣1 , 𝑒2 , . . . , 𝑣𝑛−1 𝑒𝑛 , 𝑣𝑛 ) such that the endpoints of 𝑒1 are 𝑣𝑖−1 and
𝑣𝑖 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛. The distance 𝑙𝑢,𝑣 between two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 is the
length of the shortest path joining them. In a connected graph, the average
shortest path length is defined as:
1
𝑙=
∑ 𝑙(𝑢, 𝑣)
|𝑉|(|𝑉| − 1)
𝑢≠𝑣∈𝑉

The basic metrics for connectivity in a network are density and
transitivity, also known as clustering coefficient. Density reflects the ratio

223

See R. DIESTEL, GRAPH THEORY 12 (2005).
See J. L.GROSS & JAY YELLEN, HANDBOOK OF GRAPH THEORY 335 (2004).
225
EDWARD O. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 271 (2000).
226
Id. at 272.
227
Richard Medina & George Hepner, Geospatial Analysis of Dynamic Terrorist
Networks, in VALUES AND VIOLENCE: INTANGIBLE ASPECTS OF TERRORISM 151, 151 (Ibrahim
A. Karawan et al. eds., 2008).
228
Id. at 152.
224
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of actual links over all possible links in a network.229 Transitivity examines
triadic relationships (e.g. the connection between node 𝐴 and node 𝐶,
where node 𝐵 is connected to both separately) and the balance within such
relations.230 These measures account mostly for the inevitable fluctuations
in relationships among nodes taking place over time.231 So that we can
quantify these fluctuations in our network analysis, I describe these metrics
in greater detail here.
a. Density
“Density” reflects the “connectedness” of an actor’s network.232 It
represents the ratio of the actual number of links in a network over the
potential number of links in it.233 For instance, if many of the nodes to
which a node connects are also separately connected with each other, then
the density of the network is higher.234 Density is a useful metric of
connectivity because it measures the extent to which a node’s immediate
contacts are mutually connected. In social network terms, the more of my
friends who are also friends with one another, the greater the density of my
network.235 Thus, density is a good indication of the network’s cohesion
and by extension the cost-efficiency, effectiveness, and speed within which
information and resources flow and spread within a network.
𝑛−1
Mathematically, a network can have at most 𝑛 × 2 edges so its density is
|𝐸|

2 × 𝑛×(𝑛−1), where 𝑛 is the number of nodes in a graph and 𝐸 and is the
total number of edges.
We can use density to assess various themes and questions in network
analysis but it is primarily instructive in establishing the extent of spread in
a network, that is, the number of nodes affected by the diffusion of things
like information, resources, and norms initiated by a single or set of
nodes.236 For networks of international law making, density allows us to
In a network with “n” actors “density” is reflected by n (n-1).
See Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180. See also T.A.B. SNIJDERS, TRANSITIVITY
AND TRIADS (2012).
231
RIIKKA VUOKKO & HELENA KARSTEN, WORKING WITH TECHNOLOGY IN COMPLEX
NETWORKS OF INTERACTION, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF TECHNOLOGY-BASED
INNOVATION: DIVERSIFYING THE RESEARCH AGENDA 334 (2007).
232
See Maarten de Laat, Vic Lally, Lasse Lipponen & Robert-Jan Simons, Investigating
Patterns of Interaction in Networked Learning and Computer-Supported Collaborative
Learning: A Role for Social Network Analysis, 2 INT’L J. COMPUTER-SUPPORTED
COLLABORATIVE LEARNING 87, 87-103 (2007).
233
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 90.
234
See ELIZABETH BOTT, FAMILY AND SOCIAL NETWORK: ROLES, NORMS AND
EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ORDINARY URBAN FAMILIES 97 (1957).
235
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 40.
236
Habiba Habiba & Tanya Berger-Wolf, Working for Influence: Effect of Network
Density and Modularity on Diffusion in Networks, IEEE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
229
230
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look at how easily or quickly a new normative prescription can reach other
nodes within the network. The literature on networks, statistical models,
and epidemiology of infectious diseases has also introduced the concept of
“effective density” to account for the correlation of density and spread.237
This measure of effective density is useful in international law making
networks to assess the probability of a normative effect within a network.
Effective density also allows us to assess the optimal spreaders in a
network, in other words those nodes that have the capacity to maximize the
extent of a spread of resources, information, and anything else that might
flow through the network. Networks, however, may not always have
particularly influential nodes, and thus effective density may not always be
a relevant measure in the analysis.
Habiba and Berger-Wolff’s
epidemiological study found that in networks with low effective densities
(“≤ .004 for real networks and ≤ .001 for synthetic” or artificial networks) a
spread will always be low irrespective of who generates it or the
sophistication of the approach.238 Due to the undefined structure, low
connectivity, and skewed degree distribution of such networks, most nodes
have few or no neighbors and are not able to send or receive a spread.
Only hubs or nodes with high-weighted degrees are able to influence but
there are so few of them and the nodes of the network have such low
degrees that they hardly make a difference.239 Similarly, the researchers
observed that, in networks with high densities (≥ 0.25 for real networks and
≥ .0035 for synthetic networks), most nodes are well connected and a
spread by any random node is high and comparable to a maximum spread
due to the high similarity in connectivity of nodes.240 In such a network,
spreads behave “almost deterministically” and are likely to affect the entire
network, with the effect growing as density increases.241 Finally, the study
found that in networks of intermediate densities there is a difference over

ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS

4 (2011).
Id.; see also David Kempe et al., Maxmizing the Spread of Influence Through a
Social Network, PROCEEDINGS NINTH ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY
& DATA MINING (2003); B. Aditya Prakash et al., Virus Propagation on Time-Varying
Networks: Theory and Immunization Algorithms, JOINT EUROPEAN CONF. MACHINE
LEARNING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY DATABASES (J.L. Balcazar et al. eds., 2010);
Hanghang Tong et al., On the Vulnerability of Large Graphs, IEEE 10TH INT’L CONFERENCE
ON DATA MINING 1091–1096 (2010); Nicholas C. Valler et al., Epidemic Spread in Mobile
Ad Hoc Networks: Determining the Tipping Point, INT’L CONF. RES. NETWORKING (2011);
see also DAVID KEMPE ET AL., MAXIMIZING THE SPREAD OF INFLUENCE THROUGH A SOCIAL
NETWORK (2015).
238
Habiba & Berger-Wolf, supra note 236, at 5.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
237
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the extent to which the spread is sensitive to the identity of the initiator.242
In sum, in low-density networks, higher spread can likely be achieved only
by high-degree nodes. In very dense networks, any node can initiate a
spread that can potentially reach most if not all of the network.243 Knowing
the density of a network allows us to know whether there are nodes in a
network that are particularly influential over others, that their influence can
reach a maximum number of nodes in a network, and how to identify them.
But density is also limited as a measure of comparative social
structure in an important way. Given its quality, density varies with the
size of a network. This is because it is highly unlikely that actors can
sustain an unlimited number of relationships with other actors due to
limitations of resources such as time, social interaction, and outreach.244 In
other words, very large networks are potentially less dense as it is less
likely that actors can build and maintain an exponentially large number of
connections. All other things being equal, an increase in the number of
actors in a network beyond a certain size will automatically lead to a
respective decrease in its density.245 Some of the networks we encounter in
international law making may be such large networks in which case
looking at density is an important but not conclusive element in identifying
the influence of their nodes.
b. Transivity / Clustering Coefficient
The most fundamental connection among nodes in a network is the
link between a pair of nodes, what we have been calling an edge. A
collection of nodes that have a connection with each other through one
edge and are directly adjacent is called a “neighborhood.” A relation
between nodes becomes transitive when, for instance node 𝑢 is connected
to node 𝑣, and node 𝑣 is connected to node 𝑤. Node 𝑢 is thus also
effectively connected to node 𝑤, but through a transitive relationship. The
transivity of node 𝑢 then is the proportion of neighbors of 𝑢 which are
neighbors themselves. In social network terms, the friend of my friend is
also my friend. Perhaps the fact that 𝑢 knows 𝑣 and 𝑣 knows 𝑤 doesn’t
necessarily mean that 𝑢 knows 𝑤, but it makes it more likely that the friend
of my friend is also my friend than some other randomly chosen member of
the network. This effectively creates a set of triangular relationships that
are then used to measure a variable we call the clustering coefficient.

242

Id.
Habiba & Berger-Wolf, supra note 236, at 7−8.
244
Edward O. Laumann et al., The Boundary Specification Problem in Network
Analysis, in APPLIED NETWORK ANALYSIS 20 (Ronald Burt & Michael Minor eds., 1983).
245
See SCOTT, supra note 157, at 43−44.
243
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Mathematically, we measure the clustering coefficient of a node 𝑣,
where ∑𝑢,𝑤∈𝑉 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 𝑎𝑤,𝑣 𝑎𝑢,𝑤 is the number of triangles involving v in the
graph,
∑𝑢,𝑤∈𝑉 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 𝑎𝑤,𝑣 𝑎𝑢,𝑤
𝐶(𝑣) =
∑𝑢,𝑤∈𝑉 𝑎𝑢,𝑣 𝑎𝑤,𝑢
The average clustering coefficient is then defined as,
1
𝐶=
∑ 𝐶𝑣
|𝑉|
𝑣∈𝑉

iii. Similarity or Equivalence
A more abstract aspect of understanding patterns of relations within
networks is that of similarity.246 In what way are certain nodes similar to
each other and how can we quantify this similarity? Notions of similarity
force us to think about actors not only individually as entities but also
within sets of categories. We can identify these categories, but also single
out principles that apply to those categories and their actors. In this
process, we search for those actors that are most similar and, in turn, try to
systematize what makes them similar, what makes them different, and from
which other actors or categories of actors they differ. In social network
analysis, we base this taxonomy on similarities of patterns of relations
among actors rather than individual actor attributes.247 These often
represent the “social roles” and “social positions” actors might share, or
similar building blocks that provide regularities in patterns of relations
among them.248 For example, the social role of a “husband” typically
implies a patterned set of interactions with a member of other social
categories such as “wife,” “husband,” or “child.”
Social network analysis translates this idea in suggesting that similar
nodes may be connected to the same or similar nodes and can therefore be
substitutable if one fails or decides to leave the network.249 There are two
main approaches to understanding similarity in networks: regular
equivalence and structural equivalence. Two nodes in a network are
246

HOLTON, supra note 36, at 55.
See generally A. James O’Malley & Peter V. Marsden, The Analysis of Social
Networks, 8 HEALTH SERV. & OUTCOMES RES. METHODOLOGY 222 (2008).
248
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 463.
249
See Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social
Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social Contagion
and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1291
(1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NET. 275, 279, 282−3 (1993).
247
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regularly equivalent if they have similar neighboring nodes.250 For
instance, two law professors at different universities may not have any
friends in common but they may be similar in that they each know a lot of
other law professors, law students, administrative staff, and so forth.
Structural equivalence on the other hand is established if two nodes share
many of the same network nodes.251 Two professors at the same law
school, for instance, who share many of the same colleagues are often
structurally equivalent. Measures of structural equivalence are generally
more frequent and better developed than regular equivalence.

Figure 5

The idea behind structural equivalence is to identify uniform actions
and links that define certain social positions within a network.252 Lorrain
and White first introduced structural equivalence in social network analysis
as a metric of identifying equivalent nodes.253 They define two nodes as
structurally equivalent if they have the same relations linking them to the
same nodes in the network.254 Structural equivalence in this sense is the
presence of identical ties to and from specific network actors.255 Lorrain
and White understand structurally equivalent nodes as interchangeable in
the network in which these nodes operate.256 Exactly structurally
equivalent nodes are substitutable since they mirror each other’s’
250

Ruoming Jin et al., Scalable and Axiomatic Ranking of Network Role Similarity, 8
ACM TRANSACTIONS KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY FROM DATA 1, 6 (2014).
251
Id.
252
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 126.
253
SCOTT, supra note 185, at 129.
254
Lee Douglas Sailer, Structural Equivalence: Meaning and Definition, Computation
and Application, 1 SOC. NETWORKS 73, 76 (1978).
255
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 366.
256
See Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations of Social
Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social Contagion
and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1291
(1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORKS 275, 278−79, 282 (1993).
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relationships to all other nodes. In Figure 6, nodes 𝐸 and 𝐹 each have a
single link to node 𝐵 and an identical pattern of ties that makes them
structurally equivalent. The same applies to nodes 𝐻 and 𝐼 as they too
occupy identical positions in the diagram.

Figure 6 Wasserman-Faust network to illustrate equivalence classes

257

More recent work in social network analysis suggests that exact
structural equivalence is very rare, especially in larger networks.258 Based
on this insight, newer models for structural equivalence have become less
strict.259 These models examine the degree of structural equivalence rather
than merely the presence of exactly identical ties.260 These analyses of
structural equivalence, instead of searching for identical relations, aim to
find actors who are sufficiently similar in order to be regarded as
structurally equivalent.261 The researcher must decide what threshold to
apply in establishing which actors to regard as sufficiently similar to deem
structurally equivalent and, as a consequence, substitutable.262 Actors in a
network may occupy positions of structural equivalence without the rest of
the network’s actors knowing or having recognized this effect. New roles
often emerge in a network in this way: the actions and relations among
agents may begin to crystallize into these roles before the rest of the
network fully perceives these roles for what they are. Identifying
structurally equivalent actors is one way of identifying such emerging roles
257

See generally Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180.
See generally Noah E. Friedkin, Structural Cohesion and Equivalence Explanations
of Social Homogeneity, 12 SOC. METHODS & RES. 235 (1984); Ronald S. Burton, Social
Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287,
1291 (1987); Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORK 275, 279, 282-3 (1993).
259
WASSERMAN & FAUST, supra note 164, at 364−65.
260
Hanneman & Riddle, supra note 180, at 200.
261
SCOTT, supra note 157, at 123.
262
Id.
258
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in a network.263
There are two primary models for measuring structural equivalence.
First, White and Lorrain’s model measures the structural equivalence of
two actors by correlating the columns of an adjacency matrix.264 The
higher the coefficient correlation between a pair of columns and actors, the
more structurally equivalent these actors are.265 This original construction
of social equivalence was mainly a means of describing the characteristics
of social structures. Later, Burt began to utilize the concept of structural
equivalence to predict the behavior of actors based on their social roles. 266
According to Burt’s model, structurally equivalent actors would be more
likely to behave similarly than even actors that have been grouped together
on the basis of interests, identity, or cohesion.267 This idea provides the
major insight of measures of structural equivalence: by knowing the
structurally equivalent actors in a network, we can predict to an extent the
behavior of all of those actors if we know how one of them behaves.
To mathematically calculate for either model of structural
equivalence, we first need to understand it in sets. A set is a collection of
objects that represent the elements or members of that set. Two sets, 𝐴
and 𝐵, are defined to be equal when they have precisely the same elements;
that is, if every element of 𝐴 is an element of 𝐵 and every element of 𝐵 is
an element of 𝐴. If sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 are equal, then we write 𝐴 = 𝐵. The
elements of the sets can be anything but in the case of networks the
elements for our sets are the nodes in the network. The intersection 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵
of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 represents the set that contains all elements of 𝐴 that
also belong to 𝐵, or all elements of 𝐵 that also belong to 𝐴, but no other
elements. The union 𝐴 ∪ 𝐵 of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 represents the set of those
elements that are either in 𝐴, or in 𝐵, or in both.
We measure the similarity of two sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 with the Jaccard index.
The Jaccard index, also known as the Jaccard similarity coefficient, is a
statistic measure for comparing the similarity and diversity of sample sets.
In the Jaccard index, we represent the similarity of 𝐴 and 𝐵,

263

SCOTT, supra note 157, at 122.
See JOHN SCOTT, 4 SOCIAL NETWORKS: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN SOCIOLOGY 129
(2002).
265
Mark S. Mizruchi, Cohesion, Equivalence, and Similarity of Behavior: A Theoretical
and Empirical Assessment, 15 SOC. NETWORKS 275, 282 (1993).
266
BURT, supra note 189, at 22.
267
See Ronald S. Burt, Cohesion Versus Structural Equivalence as a Basis for Network
Subgroups, in APPLIED NETWORK ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 262, 272
(Ronald S. Burt & Michael J. Minor eds., 1983); see also Joseph Galaskiewicz & Ronald S.
Burton, Interorganization Contagion in Corporate Philanthropy, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 88
(1991); BURT, supra note 189, at 190.
264
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|𝐴 ∩ 𝐵|
|𝐴 ∪ 𝐵|

We say that 𝐴 and 𝐵 are disjoint if 𝐴 does not intersect 𝐵, in other words, if
they have no elements in common. If 𝐴 and 𝐵 are disjoint then 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) =
0. If 𝐴 = 𝐵 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐽(𝐴, 𝐵) = 1. Given two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 in a graph, the
Jaccard index provides a simple and useful way to compare the similarity
of their neighborhoods. The structural equivalence of two nodes 𝑢 and 𝑣 is
the similarity of their neighborhoods, as measured by the Jaccard index:
|𝑢 ∩ 𝑣|
𝑆𝐸(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝐽(𝑢, 𝑣) =
|𝑢 ∪ 𝑣|
=

1 when 𝑢 and 𝑣 have identical neighborhoods
0 when the neighborhoods of 𝑢 and 𝑣 are disjoint

iv. The Basic Network Topologies
The form and structure of a network are highly dependent on the
metrics of the network nodes and nodes’ connections. Graph theory
describes how these metrics and connections structurally position nodes by
visualizing them and compiling them in certain types of topologies. While
these topologies are as manifold as the possibilities of connection within a
network, I address here some of the most frequent ones that we often
encounter when analyzing networks.
a. Point-to-Point Network
When two nodes are connected through an edge, the link between
them is called a point-to-point link. Networks that consist of point-to-point
links are called point-to-point networks. To better understand this concept,
we can think of a computer network. Such a network typically involves
one station that is configured to receive a connection and another station
that initiates the connection. Within this network and in between the two
stations, point-to-point links operate as dedicated circuits between the
stations to achieve higher data transfer rates.268 We also find point-to-point
networks in the airline industry: it is the simplest type of network
architecture that connects each origin with another via a one non-stop
flight.269 A point-to-point network in the airline industry has traditionally
268
MICHAEL E. WHITMAN ET AL., GUIDE TO NETWORK SECURITY 280 (2012); see also
JEFF MESNIL, MOBILE AND WEB MESSAGING: MESSAGING PROTOCOLS FOR WEB AND MOBILE
DEVICES 3 (2014).
269
Gerald N. Cook & Jeremy Goodwin, Airline Networks: A Comparison of Hub-andSpoke and Point-to-Point Systems, 17 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDU. & RES. 2, 55 (2008).
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been understood as the most unbundled, low-cost, and homogenous
service.270

Figure 7

In terms of network architecture, point-to-point networks can have a
line, tree, star, ring, or mesh topology. The line structure is the simplest
form of network structure in which every node connects with one path to
the next node in sequence.

Figure 8

In a tree network, two nodes have exactly one path between them. It
often represents a hierarchical structure that stems from a principal node
called the tree root, which forms a common link for multiple nodes,
connected by several branches.271

Figure 9

270

Eldad Ben-Yosef, The Evolution of the US Airline Industry: Technology, Entry, and
Market Structure – Three Revolutions, 72 J. AIR L. & COMM., 305, 325 (2007).
271
Samuel Pierre, Intelligent and Heuristic Approaches and Tools for the Topological
Design of Data Communication Networks, in DATABASE AND DATA COMMUNICATION
NETWORK SYSTEMS: TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS 289, 295 (Cornelius T. Leondes ed.,
2002).
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The star topology is also a tree kind of topology but one that contains
one central node—the star—that is connected by a point-to-point link to all
other nodes of the network.272

Figure 10

In a ring topology, each node connects to exactly two other nodes
forming one single continuous pathway. In other words, all nodes form a
closed ring within which each node is connected to the next one in the
circle.273

Figure 11

Finally, nodes form a mesh topology when each pair of nodes in a
network is linked by more than one path.274

Figure 12

272
273
274

Id.
Id.
Id.
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b. Hub-and-Spoke Network
While point-to-point networks are often the basic network
architecture, point-to-point links tend to become part of centralized or
distributed network structures that include nodes connected directly or
through more centralized nodes called hubs.275 Such networks take the
form of hub-and-spoke networks. Based on their relative connectivity,
nodes are classified as hubs and non-hubs. Nodes with higher degrees of
connectivity are defined as hubs.276 In other words, a hub is a node with a
larger number of links surrounded by nodes that have fewer links, also
known as non-hubs.277 Hubs are those nodes that have the most structured
and intense relationships to other nodes in the network and functionally
become “privileged nodes.”278 They are the network’s strongest links.279
Hubs’ structural position within the network facilitates connectivity
between interacting nodes.280 Hubs are thus the main means of information
management, exchange,281 and cooperation in a network.282 A hub
concentrates the network flow not only spatially but also temporally, and
maximizes connectivity.283
The notion of hubs is used in many disciplines and sectors: hub-andspoke free trade agreements;284 medical research networks;285 education;286
275

Ben-Yosef, supra note 270, at 326.
ASFAR S. AZMI, SYSTEMS BIOLOGY IN CANCER RESEARCH AND DRUG DISCOVERY 173
(2012).
277
Kyaw Tun et al., Rich Can Get Poor: Conversion of Hub to Non-Hub Proteins, 2
SYS. AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 75 (2008).
278
PETER J. TAYLOR, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN ANALYSIS 26 (2004).
279
RICHARD KOCK & GREG LOCKWOOD, SUPERCONNECT: HARNESSING THE POWER OF
NETWORKS AND THE STRENGTH OF WEAK LINKS 67 (2011).
280
Morton E. O’Kelly, A Geographer’s Analysis of Hub-and-Spoke Networks, 6 J.
TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 171 (1998).
281
Tun et al., supra note 277, at 79.
282
KOCK & LOCKWOOD, supra note 279.
283
GUILLAUME BURGHOUWT, AIRLINE NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPORT PLANNING 15 (2007).
284
Jung Hur et al., Effects of Hub-and-Spoke Free Trade Agreements on Trade: A Panel
Data Analysis, 38 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1105 (2010); see, e.g., Carsten Kowalczyk &
Ronald J. Wonnacott, Hubs and Spokes, and Free Trade in the Americas 2 (Nat’l Bureau
Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4198, 1992) (“In August, 1992, Canada, Mexico and the
United States presented a free trade agreement (FTA) to cover a North American market
with a combined GNP approaching $7 trillion and an annual trade in goods and services
among its members exceeding $270 billion. Although this agreement is essentially in a
trilateral PTA format, full ratification by all three countries IS not guaranteed. If Canada
were not to ratify, the result could be a Mexico-U.S. bilateral ETA, creating a hub-andspoke system in which the United States as the hub would have one bilateral spoke
agreement with Canada (the 1989 Canada-U.S. PTA), and another with Mexico; in other
words, two free trade areas overlapping on the United States.”).
285
PETER J. TAYLOR & BEN DERUDDER, WORLD CITY NETWORK: A GLOBAL URBAN
ANALYSIS 15 (2015).
276
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money laundering; banking;287 diplomacy;288 air and rail transportation and
telecommunications, shipping; and postal mail systems.289 Hub-and-spoke
networks increased as the need for multiple origin nodes to connect to
multiple destination nodes in a network increased and made the point-topoint system that directly connects every origin node to every destination
node inefficient and, at times, practically unattainable. The hub-and-spoke
network aggregates all flow into one hub that is fully connected, or into
multiple hubs that are connected via an inter-hub (hub-hub) link. When
compared with a point-to-point network, the hub-and-spoke network has a
smaller number of links. But since most traffic flows through the hub or
through the inter-hub links, the network has quicker flow and significantly
less transactional and operating costs.290 Networks that include hubs also
have more internal hierarchy despite the typical decentralized nature of
most networks.291 Knowing the topology of a network including the
presence of a hub or hubs allows us to have a better structural sense of the
networks, improve our understanding of network flows, and identify the
actors that are critical to network flows.
The simplest topology of a hub in a network is that of a hub-andspoke represented by a wheel that contains the hub node in the center,
linked to nodes at the outside end of each spoke.292
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Ian L.G. Wadley, U.S. and Them: Hubs, Spokes, & Integration with Reference to
Transboundary Environment and Resources Issues, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 572, 576
(2003).
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Sibel Alumur & Bahar Y. Kara, Network Hub Location Problems: The State of the
Art, 190 EUROPEAN J. OPERATIONAL RES. 1, 13 (2008); see BURGHOUWT, supra note 283, at
2−3 (arguing that after the United States deregulation most major U.S. airline dropped their
point-to-point structures and introduced hub-and-spoke networks instead) (“These are
concentrated spatially around one or more hub airports where passengers can transfer to
their connecting flights within a limited time window . . . . In a highly competitive market,
hub-and-spoke systems offer an airline the opportunity to benefit from certain cost and
demand side advantages, to deter entry, and to exercise some bureaucratic control over the
hub airport.”); see also Ben-Yosef, supra note 270, at 327.
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Figure 13

The central hub in this network enjoys optimal connectivity as it
connects to all nodes through the spokes and is primarily responsible for
the total connectivity in a hub-and-spoke network. The outside nodes have
minimal connectivity, connecting mainly through the hub, and not to each
other. We can categorize hubs into three main topologies based on the
remaining structural qualities of the network, as represented in Figure 14
below. In centralized networks, a central hub resembles a star topology.
The central node of the star is the hub, and all traffic originates from it or
flows through it. In a decentralized network, there are multiple smaller
centralized hubs. And finally, in a distributed network, there are no
centralized hubs but there are hubs that are distributed more evenly across
the network.293

Figure14

293
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c. Cliques
While the above topologies look at the network as a whole, we can
also analyze the network from the perspective of its “sub-cultures.” Any
numerically smaller neighborhoods of nodes, such as dyads and triads, are
considered a sub-culture with a corresponding substructure. The main
approach to understanding the structure of a network’s subculture is to
measure the density of the connection of the nodes in the subculture. When
every node in this substructure is connected to every other node and no
other nodes can be added to it without making it less connected, we define
this denser cluster as a “clique.”294 For example, a set of six nodes in a
network is a clique if and only if each of these six nodes is directly
connected to the other five and there is no other node anywhere in the
network that could be added to make a group of six connected nodes
instead of five. A clique indicates a highly cohesive subgroup whose nodes
are highly connected—a group of classmates in a high school for instance.

IV. CONCLUSION & NEXT RESEARCH STEPS
The Westphalian model of international law has been slow and
reluctant in identifying and assessing the effects of non-state actors in
international law making.295 The partiality of legal personality may, in part,
explain this inertia. The discourse used in international law is evidence of
the central bias that holds the state as the main, and, at times, sole point of
reference in international law making. As Philip Alston suggested,
international law suffers from the “not-a-cat-syndrome” in its reference to
294
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“non-state actors” as “non-state.”296 This marginalizes the scope of
research and reinforces “the assumption that the state is the only central
actor.”297 Other disciplines have been quicker or perhaps less resistant to
recognize the transition from a hierarchical structure to a network one, and
to embrace networks, either mixed with other structures, or in isolation.
The analytic questions posed by other disciplines relating to their networks
and methodological processes have much to offer to a nascent network
analysis of international law. They can help us learn to recognize networks
in various parts of life and law. Being able to adjust our mental lenses
provides us with an extra set, the set of networks, that can complement
existing viewpoints, offer a more nuanced description of international
legislative action, and help answer faltering questions.
Social scientists have, for years, developed a set of methods to study
patterns of connection and social relations. They have used these methods
to approach many classic problems premised on relation and connection.
Applying these methods beyond the field of social sciences can enrich our
understanding of other fields, such as law. Social network analysis is a
valuable tool for identifying and mapping actors’ relationships by
providing a descriptive account of the nature and effects of the networks
these actors are involved in. It offers a way to quantify the impact of actors
in the making of international law but also tailor networked solutions to
existing international problems through legislative action. By applying a
series of metrics and algorithms, social network analysis can offer a more
empirically comprehensive analysis of international law making and
complement existing or proposed theoretical frameworks.
By means of this Article, I have aimed to show how the tools of
network analysis describe the relations between actors in a network, and
how they can be applied on different relational and networked contexts
such as those of international legislative action. Becoming more familiar
with these methods will help see the problems and possibilities of
international law making in new ways. These methods, however, are only
tools. The next step for future research on the intersection between
international law and network analysis is to apply the methods and
frameworks to specific networks that emerge in international law making to
address international problems through international normative
development such as treaty, customary international law, or even soft law.
Who are the actors responsible for the making of international law
today? Which of those actors matter most, and why? What type of
synergies do they form in the making of international law? Can we map

296
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the development of international law norms by configuring the
relationships among these actors? What can we learn about the emergence,
crystallization, and decline of international law norms from looking at these
interactions? Are networks more effective at putting forward normative
developments in international law, and under what terms? What can these
insights offer to current and future international legislative action?
Network analysis not only allows us to measure and map these new
dynamics but also provides the springboard on which to build a new
framework for international legislative action. Network analysis paints a
much clearer picture of whom to call upon when putting forward a
legislative agenda, when to introduce a normative prescription, and how to
best diffuse it based on the actors involved in each legislative process.
Network analysis also helps us determine the most powerful actors or the
leaders in various networks, and to quantify the effect of their position to
normative development. Finally, network analysis allows us to map how
actors influence each other’s normative preferences and outcomes, the
preferences and outcomes of their networks and other networks, what they
learn from each other, and how they are likely to act based on the structures
they are embedded in.
International law has been slow in systematically addressing issues of
method. International law making is one of the areas that most requires
methodological insight, conceptual clarity, and legal certainty.
Methodological advances in this field can significantly contribute to
ongoing normative and procedural debates, enlighten future law and policy
making, and increase legal certainty. Understanding and integrating these
insights is critical to mapping existing and future successful international
legislative action. These are just some of the many avenues for future
research that have the potential to clarify the landscape of international
lawmaking using the methodological lens of network theory.

